1957 Vientiane agreement, the bloc negotiating strategy was
remarkably successful in wringing unilateral concessions from
the Phouma government. Internally, the Pathet Lao won recognition
as a legal political party, participation in a coalition
government, and the opportunity to implant its functionaries
within the government administrat ion. Although -Pathet Lao
agreement to permit integration of their troops into the national
army and to surrender control over the two northern
provinces appeared to be a substantial quid pro quo, there
is good evidence that the Laotian Communistshadno
tion of abiding by these provisions of the agreement.
intenExternally,
the Phouma regime was persuaded to adopt a
policy of non-alignment by a combination of threats and blandishments
on the part of Peiping. Symbolizing the leading
role of Communist China in this effort was Souvanna Phouma's
trip to Peipigg in August 1956. On this occasion, the Laotian
premier publicly disavowed any interest in SEATO and pledged
to follow thereafter a "policy of peace and neutrality." This
pledge, supplemented by promises to develop economic, cultural
and diplomatic relations with the Communist bloc was reaffirmed
in the negotiated settlement a year later. In contrast with
the record of failure in Vietnam througnout this period, the
Vientiane agreement of November 1957 constituted an important
victory for the bloc strategy of "peaceful coexistence" in
Laos.