This literature implicitly assumes that the market is inefficient, i.e. that the
market relies on bottom line accounting numbers without regard to the
procedures used to generate them.' It is, however, not necessary for the stock
market's price formation process to exhibit functional fixation in order to
establish smoothing incentives; it is sufficient for claimholders to exhibit
bounded rationality. Alternatively, it is sufficient for management to believe
that the market relies on accounting numbers. A questionnaire study by
Mayer-Sommer (1979) found that 83 per cent of Fortune 500 controllers
rejected the idea of market efficiency. Managers may, however, have
incentives to misrepresent their beliefs, especially to standard setters. Using an
approach which controls for this, O'Keefe and Soloman's (1985) investigation
of managers' comment letters to FASB provides further evidence that many
managers do not believe in market efficiency. In all cases, ceteris paribus, the
higher the variability of the firm's earnings, the stronger the incentive for
management to smooth income.