It is often said that the issue which split the Madhyamika into Svatantrika and Prasaṅgika branches was one of methodology, and this certainly does explain the origins of their names although, as so often in the study of Mahayana thought, relatively little work has been done on these subschools and conclusions are still very provisional. It is said that Bhavaviveka objected to the use by Buddhapalita of prasaṅga (‘consequence’) arguments – that is, arguments which try to convince the opponent of the error of his ways by simply pointing out that the opponent’s position entails undesired consequences for the opponent himself. According to Bhavaviveka this simply will not do. It is necessary also to employ an autonomous, or independent, (svatantra) inference put into the proper logical structure (or ‘syllogistic form’) recognized by other schools of Indian philosophy, particularly the Buddhist logicians, headed by the brilliant Dignaga (fifth–sixth centuries CE). This dispute may look fairly minor, but perhaps it bulked large in an environment of scholastic precision.21 It does have its soteriological dimension, however. According to the founder of the dGe lugs tradition, Tsong kha pa, the difference between the two subschools here is not simply one of method, but rather of the most effective way of bringing the opponent to an inferential understanding of emptiness which is, as we have seen, one type of wisdom (prajñā). For Candrakīrti, however, rushing to the defence of Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka was simply addicted to logic. Note also that for Tsong kha pa, while there is a distinction between Svatantrika and Prasaṅgika on this issue of method it is not, in spite of their names, their characteristic distinction. The distinctive difference between the two subschools of Madhyamika lies in the acceptance by the Svatantrika of svabhāva (‘intrinsic nature’; see below) convention- ally, although all Madhyamikas deny its ultimate existence. For the Prasaógika, following Candrakīrti, this is a contradiction in terms. Where there is a svabhAva there has to be the fullest sort of existence possible, ultimate existence. It hence makes no sense to talk of something having a svabhāva conventionally. Indeed, the svabhAva, since it entails intrinsic or inherent existence, is simply a fiction on any level. There is no such thing.