The direct evidence has three main parts. First, the crisis hit only countries that were in a
vulnerable position, i.e. with high levels of short-term foreign debt relative to short-term foreign
assets. No emerging market with low levels of short-term debt relative to reserves was hit, even
those with high levels of corruption and weak banking systems. Second, the crisis hit several
countries with widely varying economic structures and fundamentals within a relatively short
period of time. Korea and Indonesia had relatively little in common at the time of the crisis,
except the levels of short-term debt and a common geographical region. Third, the crisis eased up
after about one year, even though several fundamental conditions (e.g., corporate and bank
financial health) were not significantly improved. The most striking example is Indonesia, where
the rupiah appreciated substantially between mid-July and the end of October, starting only weeks
after the chaos surrounding the resignation of Suharto. This can hardly be interpreted as a return
of investor confidence, since most investors are even more uncertain about Indonesia=s future in
the wake of Suharto=s downfall, and the ensuing political and social instability. The easing of the
crisis reflects, in our interpretation, the end of the short-term outflows of capital. As debts were
repaid, rescheduled, or defaulted upon, there was little foreign capital left to flee. As the net
capital outflows subsided, the intense pressure on the exchange rate ended, and the overshooting
caused by financial panic was reversed.