There is now a substantial body of evidence indicating that sustained—and, therefore, likely predictable—
high rates of inflation can have adverse consequences either for an economy's long-run rate of real growth or for
its long-run level of real activity.1 This finding raises an obvious question. By what mechanisms can a perfectly
understood and permanent increase in the inflation rate affect long-run real output?
A growing theoretical literature describes mechanisms whereby even predictable increases in the rate of
inflation interfere with the ability of the financial sector to allocate resources effectively. More specifically, recent
theories emphasize the importance of informational asymmetries in credit markets and demonstrate how increases
in the rate of inflation adversely affect credit market frictions with negative repercussions for financial sector (both
banks and equity market) performance and therefore long-run real activity [Huybens and Smith 1998, 1999]. The
common feature of these theories is that there is an informational friction whose severity is endogenous. Given
this feature, an increase in the rate of inflation drives down the real rate of return not just on money, but on assets
in general. The implied reduction in real returns exacerbates credit market frictions.2 Since these market frictions
lead to the rationing of credit, credit rationing becomes more severe as inflation rises. As a result, the financial
sector makes fewer loans, resource allocation is less efficient, and intermediary activity diminishes with adverse
implications for capital investment. The reduction in capital formation negatively influences both long-run
economic performance and equity market activity, where claims to capital ownership are traded [Huybens and
Smith 1999 and Boyd and Smith 1996].