. A second core assumption of the neo-realist definition of power is that a ‘self-help’ world mean that state have to be worried about relative as well as absolute gains. In their 1980 debates with neo-Liberals, neo-realists were famously pessimistic about the prospects for lasting international co-operation for the reasons that, as Grieco (1988:487) put it: “states must give serious attention to the gains of partners” because they worry that today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gain that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future.
In the context of ASEAN scholarship, realists and neo-realists justify using this approach to power on the basis that not only does it yield sound analyses but also regional leaders actually bring this perspective to foreign policy making.Hill and tow [2002: 162] argue that the realist approach ‘is still regarded as the predominant outlook held by Southeast Asian security practitioners’ , while Emmers [2003: 6] states that analysts ‘should not underestimate the persistence of realist beliefs among political leaders’ in the region. For his part, Hund [2003:388] singles out Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee as emphasizing the importance of the United States as partner in balancing China “If we are to have elbow room to ourselves”.Neo-realists, then, see their analyses as reflecting the policies mindsets of the ASEAN members and their leaders.