As noted earlier, it had become painfully clear by mid-
1955 that the authorities in South Vietnam would neither succumb
to Communist subversion nor consent to the holding of
nation-wide elect ions in the absence of effective and impartial
supervision of the proposed balloting. (Moreover, the Government
in South Vietnam had not signed the Geneva accords and
was not bound by their provisions). Constrained by the overall
bloc strategy of "peaceful coexistence" from resorting to
military force, the Lao Dong party leaderbhip then laid down
the new tactical line in August 1955 of forming a "broad nat
ional united front. . .to strive for national unification by
peaceful means." Posing internally as a strong and dynamic
government capable of outstripping the South in "peaceful
competition," North Vietnam's strategy externally was to pose
as a peaceful and loyal adherent to the Geneva Agreements and
to seek international support in order to press Diem into
negotiations for a national election.
Serving.with Great Britain as a permapent co-chairman
of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union acknowledged in
the joint Nehru-Bulganin declaration of June 1955 that it
had "undertaken special responsibilities" in overseeing implementation
of the Geneva settlement. Nevertheless, its
condGct throughout the ensuing three-year period was to belie
this statement. In April 1956, the visit of Mikoyan to Hanoi
proved such a disappointment to North Vietnam that not even
the customary joint communique was forthcoming. In a meeting
of the Geneva co-chairmen in London the following month, the