In a Hobbesian democracy, voting is not a procedure for choosing
representatives. but for determining
who shall occupy the position of the Sovereign. There is an obvious moral
problem here.Let us return for a while to the thought experiment that we
mentioned earlier. The one voter who does show up on Election Day
designates the party (or, if the electoral rules allow him to do so, the
individuals) that will occupy all the seats in the Parliament. At the same time,
he designates the party that will form the government. He knows, or ought to
know, that his choice—should it be decisive, as in his case it turns out to be—
determines who shall rule not only him but also every other person in the
State. Consequently, he ought to know that his right to vote implies the right to
determine who shall rule all persons in the State. He also ought to know that
his vote will have that effect if the circumstances are favourable. Now,
whatever goes for the one actual voter of our hypothetical case also goes for
the swing voter in a close election and indeed for any voter whatsoever. That
is so because the legal rights of voters are the same regardless of how they or
others vote and regardless of whether they or others vote at all. Thus, we see
that the legal premise of voting in a Hobbesian democracy is that every person
has the right to rule all other persons in the State (even if it is understood that
few will succeed in getting to rule all others).