4.9 SYSTEMIC RISK Looking beyond the financial crisis to improved regulation, US federal agencies need to think about what is needed to avoid a similar scenario occurring in the future. As identified by Lord Turner, the major failure, shared by bankers, regulators, central banks, finance ministers and academics across the world, was the failure to identify that the whole system was fraught with market-wide, systemic risk (Turner 2009). The key problem was not that the supervision of individual banks was insufficient, but that the regulator failed to see the wood for the trees. They failed to piece together the jigsaw puzzle of a large US current account deficit, rapid credit extension and house price rises and the purchase of mortgage-backed securities by US institutions performing a new form of maturity transformation.27 Regulators, not only in the US, failed to realise that there was an increase in total system risk to which financial regulators, overall authorities, central banks and fiscal authorities needed to respond. To their detriment regulators had been too preoccupied with institution-by-institution supervision of idiosyncratic risk28 rather looking at the broad horizon.
4.9 SYSTEMIC RISK Looking beyond the financial crisis to improved regulation, US federal agencies need to think about what is needed to avoid a similar scenario occurring in the future. As identified by Lord Turner, the major failure, shared by bankers, regulators, central banks, finance ministers and academics across the world, was the failure to identify that the whole system was fraught with market-wide, systemic risk (Turner 2009). The key problem was not that the supervision of individual banks was insufficient, but that the regulator failed to see the wood for the trees. They failed to piece together the jigsaw puzzle of a large US current account deficit, rapid credit extension and house price rises and the purchase of mortgage-backed securities by US institutions performing a new form of maturity transformation.27 Regulators, not only in the US, failed to realise that there was an increase in total system risk to which financial regulators, overall authorities, central banks and fiscal authorities needed to respond. To their detriment regulators had been too preoccupied with institution-by-institution supervision of idiosyncratic risk28 rather looking at the broad horizon.
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