-7-
UVA-F-1483
The gain in intrinsic value could be modeled as the value added by a business above and
beyond the charge for the use of capital in that business. The gain in intrinsic value was
analogous to the economic-profit and market-value-added measures used by analysts in
leading corporations to assess financial performance. Those measures focus on the ability to
earn returns in excess of the cost of capital.
5.
Risk and discount rates
. Conventional academic and practitioner thinking held that the more
risk one took, the more one should get paid. Thus, discount rates used in determining
intrinsic values should be determined by the risk of the cash flows being valued. The
conventional model for estimating discount rates was the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), which added a risk premium to the long-term risk-free rate of return, such as the
U.S. Treasury bond yield.
Buffett departed from conventional thinking by using the rate of return on the long-term (for
example, 30 year) U.S. Treasury bond to discount cash flows.
13
Defending this practice,
Buffett argued that he avoided risk, and therefore should use a “risk-free” discount rate. His
firm used almost no debt financing. He focused on companies with predictable and stable
earnings. He or his vice chair, Charlie Munger, sat on the boards of directors, where they
obtained a candid, inside view of the company and could intervene in managements’
decisions if necessary. Buffett once said, “I put a heavy weight on certainty. If you do that,
the whole idea of a risk factor doesn’t make sense to me. Risk comes from not knowing what
you’re doing.”
14
He also wrote:
We define risk, using dictionary terms, as “the possibility of loss or injury.”
Academics, however, like to define “risk” differently, averring that it is the
relative volatility of a stock or a portfolio of stocks—that is, the volatility as
compared to that of a large universe of stocks. Employing databases and
statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the “beta” of a stock—
its relative volatility in the past—and then build arcane investment and capital
allocation theories around this calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to
measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: it is better to be
approximately right than precisely wrong.
15
6.
Diversification
. Buffett disagreed with conventional wisdom that investors should hold a
broad portfolio of stocks in order to shed company-specific risk. In his view, investors
typically purchased far too many stocks rather than waiting for one exceptional company.
Buffett said,
Figure businesses out that you understand and concentrate. Diversification is
protection against ignorance, but if you don’t feel ignorant, the need for it goes
down drastically.
16
-7-
UVA-F-1483
The gain in intrinsic value could be modeled as the value added by a business above and
beyond the charge for the use of capital in that business. The gain in intrinsic value was
analogous to the economic-profit and market-value-added measures used by analysts in
leading corporations to assess financial performance. Those measures focus on the ability to
earn returns in excess of the cost of capital.
5.
Risk and discount rates
. Conventional academic and practitioner thinking held that the more
risk one took, the more one should get paid. Thus, discount rates used in determining
intrinsic values should be determined by the risk of the cash flows being valued. The
conventional model for estimating discount rates was the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), which added a risk premium to the long-term risk-free rate of return, such as the
U.S. Treasury bond yield.
Buffett departed from conventional thinking by using the rate of return on the long-term (for
example, 30 year) U.S. Treasury bond to discount cash flows.
13
Defending this practice,
Buffett argued that he avoided risk, and therefore should use a “risk-free” discount rate. His
firm used almost no debt financing. He focused on companies with predictable and stable
earnings. He or his vice chair, Charlie Munger, sat on the boards of directors, where they
obtained a candid, inside view of the company and could intervene in managements’
decisions if necessary. Buffett once said, “I put a heavy weight on certainty. If you do that,
the whole idea of a risk factor doesn’t make sense to me. Risk comes from not knowing what
you’re doing.”
14
He also wrote:
We define risk, using dictionary terms, as “the possibility of loss or injury.”
Academics, however, like to define “risk” differently, averring that it is the
relative volatility of a stock or a portfolio of stocks—that is, the volatility as
compared to that of a large universe of stocks. Employing databases and
statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the “beta” of a stock—
its relative volatility in the past—and then build arcane investment and capital
allocation theories around this calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to
measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: it is better to be
approximately right than precisely wrong.
15
6.
Diversification
. Buffett disagreed with conventional wisdom that investors should hold a
broad portfolio of stocks in order to shed company-specific risk. In his view, investors
typically purchased far too many stocks rather than waiting for one exceptional company.
Buffett said,
Figure businesses out that you understand and concentrate. Diversification is
protection against ignorance, but if you don’t feel ignorant, the need for it goes
down drastically.
16
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