i. introduction
There is a bewildering array of topics at the intersection of cinematic art and philosophical inquiry, and a variety of approaches within each topic. The confusion arising from the multitude of approaches to a multitude of issues is reflected in the nomenclature employed to link philosophy and film: philosophy of film, philosophy in film, philosophy on film, philosophy through film, film as philosophy, film-philosophy, and filmosophy— among others. The issue is further complicated by the different meanings attached to both ‘film’ and
‘philosophy’ in the context of the exploration of the relationship between them. I shall take ‘film’ to refer to the art form of moving photorealistic pictures (whether photochemical or digital in ori- gin), ‘a film’ to be a work of cinema, and ‘cinematic art’ as synonymous with the art form of film.1 My claim is that Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) can meet both criteria of cinema as analytic phi- losophy in the bold thesis.2 Livingston states:
What I am calling the bold thesis is a conjunction of strong claims with regard to the means and results
conditions—namely, the idea that some films can make historically innovative and independent contributions to philosophy by means exclusive to the cinematic medium or art form.3
He identifies the two conditions as follows:
(1) a conception of which sorts of exclusive capacities of the cinematic medium (or, alternatively, the cinematic art form) are said to make a special contribution to philosophy, and (2) claims about the nature of the latter contribution (such as strong contention about its originality, significance, or independence). As (1) pertains to means and (2) pertains to the end product, we can call these the means and results conditions, respectively.4
Smuts makes the following observation on the means condition: “the general spirit of this qualification is to distinguish between filmed presentations of philosophical debates, discussions, or arguments, and other more interesting candidates.”5
Smuts warns against the “super bold” thesis, which holds that film can make a unique—rather than original—contribution to philosophical inquiry,
such as Gilles Deleuze’s notion of cinema’s ability to reconceptualize time and movement.6 Al- though the features of Memento which I discuss suggest that the film does indeed do philosophy in a unique manner, I shall argue for the weaker the- sis presented by Smuts: “that some films can make philosophical contributions by paradigmatic cinematic means.”7 Smuts notes that the purpose of the results condition “is to help distinguish be- tween the mere illustration of a preexisting philosophical concept and the presentation of a new idea.”8 The results condition has two elements, innovation and independence, and Smuts is once again wary of setting standards which are too demanding: the innovation requirement is not that “all philosophical contributions made by films must be innovative, but that in principle films should be capable of innovation.”9 Most philos- ophy lacks innovation in the sense of making an original contribution to the discipline, and there is thus no need to demand this feature of film, as long as film has the potential to make such a contribution. The independence element of Livingston’s thesis is a requirement that the philosophical contribution is not dependent upon a particular interpretation or philosophical context, that is, imported into the film by the audience.10 I could, for example, offer an interpretation of George Roy Hill’s Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (1969) based on Martin Heidegger’s conception of authenticity, particularly being-towards-death. Even if my interpretation provided fresh insights into the film, I would clearly be imposing Heidegger’s philosophy on the work, whereas a similar interpretation of Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line (1998) is less likely to be regarded as importation and more likely exegesis.11 I argue that Memento makes an innovative and independent contribution to philosophical knowledge by experiential affirmation, a means which is paradigmatic of the cinematic art form.
i. introduction
There is a bewildering array of topics at the intersection of cinematic art and philosophical inquiry, and a variety of approaches within each topic. The confusion arising from the multitude of approaches to a multitude of issues is reflected in the nomenclature employed to link philosophy and film: philosophy of film, philosophy in film, philosophy on film, philosophy through film, film as philosophy, film-philosophy, and filmosophy— among others. The issue is further complicated by the different meanings attached to both ‘film’ and
‘philosophy’ in the context of the exploration of the relationship between them. I shall take ‘film’ to refer to the art form of moving photorealistic pictures (whether photochemical or digital in ori- gin), ‘a film’ to be a work of cinema, and ‘cinematic art’ as synonymous with the art form of film.1 My claim is that Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) can meet both criteria of cinema as analytic phi- losophy in the bold thesis.2 Livingston states:
What I am calling the bold thesis is a conjunction of strong claims with regard to the means and results
conditions—namely, the idea that some films can make historically innovative and independent contributions to philosophy by means exclusive to the cinematic medium or art form.3
He identifies the two conditions as follows:
(1) a conception of which sorts of exclusive capacities of the cinematic medium (or, alternatively, the cinematic art form) are said to make a special contribution to philosophy, and (2) claims about the nature of the latter contribution (such as strong contention about its originality, significance, or independence). As (1) pertains to means and (2) pertains to the end product, we can call these the means and results conditions, respectively.4
Smuts makes the following observation on the means condition: “the general spirit of this qualification is to distinguish between filmed presentations of philosophical debates, discussions, or arguments, and other more interesting candidates.”5
Smuts warns against the “super bold” thesis, which holds that film can make a unique—rather than original—contribution to philosophical inquiry,
such as Gilles Deleuze’s notion of cinema’s ability to reconceptualize time and movement.6 Al- though the features of Memento which I discuss suggest that the film does indeed do philosophy in a unique manner, I shall argue for the weaker the- sis presented by Smuts: “that some films can make philosophical contributions by paradigmatic cinematic means.”7 Smuts notes that the purpose of the results condition “is to help distinguish be- tween the mere illustration of a preexisting philosophical concept and the presentation of a new idea.”8 The results condition has two elements, innovation and independence, and Smuts is once again wary of setting standards which are too demanding: the innovation requirement is not that “all philosophical contributions made by films must be innovative, but that in principle films should be capable of innovation.”9 Most philos- ophy lacks innovation in the sense of making an original contribution to the discipline, and there is thus no need to demand this feature of film, as long as film has the potential to make such a contribution. The independence element of Livingston’s thesis is a requirement that the philosophical contribution is not dependent upon a particular interpretation or philosophical context, that is, imported into the film by the audience.10 I could, for example, offer an interpretation of George Roy Hill’s Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (1969) based on Martin Heidegger’s conception of authenticity, particularly being-towards-death. Even if my interpretation provided fresh insights into the film, I would clearly be imposing Heidegger’s philosophy on the work, whereas a similar interpretation of Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line (1998) is less likely to be regarded as importation and more likely exegesis.11 I argue that Memento makes an innovative and independent contribution to philosophical knowledge by experiential affirmation, a means which is paradigmatic of the cinematic art form.
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