The ability to exercise control over any of these valued resources provides the actor with an
important source of power. The higher the scarcity of the valued resource, the more the power
of the entity that controls that resource increases (Wright & McMahan, 1992). If external parties
control vital resources, an organization is vulnerable and will strive to acquire control in order to
minimize its dependence (DeCieri & Dowling, 1998). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Scott (1987)
argue that organizations can attempt to reduce this dependency through buffering (e.g. internalizing
control by coding of inputs for the production process, or stockpiling), as well as using bridging
strategies (e.g., bargaining for more independence, co-optation, joint ventures, or the absorption
of resource holders). The theory has been tested empirically through the work of authors such
as Pfeffer and Moore (1980), Pfeffer and Cohen (1984), and Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987).