Efficiency in the allocation of credit has to be examined in light of these
practical realities. Suppose, for example, that a bank is considering providing
credit for a project to someone who, after receiving the loan, will choose how
hard to work to make his project successful. If the project is successful, then
the loan is repaid, but, if it fails, the individual is assumed to default. As the
size of the loan increases, the borrower's effort is likely to slacken, because a
larger share of the proceeds of the project go to the bank. If the bank cannot
monitor the borrower's actions (perhaps because doing so is prohibitively costly), a bigger loan tends to be associated with a lower probability of repayment.
A bank that wants to maximize profits is therefore likely to offer a smaller loan
than it would if monitoring were costless. This may result in less investment
in the economy and, in comparison with a situation in which information is
costless, would appear to entail a reduction in efficiency. With full information, the bank should be willing to lend more, to the advantage of both the
borrower and the lender. Thus, tested against the benchmark of costless monitoring, there appears to be a market failure- that is, the market has not realized a potential Pareto improvement.
But in the real world monitoring is not costless and information and enforcement are not perfect. A standard of efficiency impossible to achieve in the
real world is not a useful test against which to define market failure. The test
of efficiency should still be that a Pareto improvement is impossible to find,
but such an improvement must be sought taking into account the imperfections
of information and enforcementhat the market in question has to deal withthat is using the concept of constrained Pareto efficiency. By this standard, the
outcome described above, where the lender reduced the amount lent to a borrower because of monitoring difficulties, could in fact be efficient in a constrained sense. The information problem may still have an efficiency cost to
society, but from an operational point of view that cost has no relevance.
The argument that problems in credit markets result in a lower level of output, and perhaps too much risk-taking relative to some ideal situation where
information is freely available, is frequently used to justify subsidized credit or
the establishment of government-owned banks in areas that appear to be poorly served by the public sector. This argument is a non sequitur and should be
resisted whenever encountered. In thinking about market failure and constrained Pareto efficiency, the full set of feasibility constraints for allocating resources needs to be considered. In this article, market failure is taken to mean
the inability of a free market to bring about a constrained Pareto-efficient allocation of credit, in the sense defined above (see Dixit 1987 for a sample formal analysis). The rest of the article examines the implications of this concept.
Applying the criterion of constrained Pareto efficiency narrows the field for
market failure, but it still leaves room for a fairly broad array of cases in which
resources could end up being inefficiently allocated. In the illustration of Pareto
improvement used above, only the well-being of the two individuals involved
in a trade was considered. But if externalities enter the picture in other words, if a third party is affected, possibly negatively, by the decision of the
other two-a Pareto improvement is clearly not guaranteed, even if the two
principals are made better off. It is well known that markets operate inefficiently if there are externalities (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986 for a general
discussion), and specific types of externalities may particularly afflict credit
markets. One important role for government policy to improve the working of
credit markets is to deal impartially with externality problems
Efficiency in the allocation of credit has to be examined in light of thesepractical realities. Suppose, for example, that a bank is considering providingcredit for a project to someone who, after receiving the loan, will choose howhard to work to make his project successful. If the project is successful, thenthe loan is repaid, but, if it fails, the individual is assumed to default. As thesize of the loan increases, the borrower's effort is likely to slacken, because alarger share of the proceeds of the project go to the bank. If the bank cannotmonitor the borrower's actions (perhaps because doing so is prohibitively costly), a bigger loan tends to be associated with a lower probability of repayment.A bank that wants to maximize profits is therefore likely to offer a smaller loanthan it would if monitoring were costless. This may result in less investmentin the economy and, in comparison with a situation in which information iscostless, would appear to entail a reduction in efficiency. With full information, the bank should be willing to lend more, to the advantage of both theborrower and the lender. Thus, tested against the benchmark of costless monitoring, there appears to be a market failure- that is, the market has not realized a potential Pareto improvement.But in the real world monitoring is not costless and information and enforcement are not perfect. A standard of efficiency impossible to achieve in thereal world is not a useful test against which to define market failure. The testof efficiency should still be that a Pareto improvement is impossible to find,but such an improvement must be sought taking into account the imperfectionsof information and enforcementhat the market in question has to deal withthat is using the concept of constrained Pareto efficiency. By this standard, theoutcome described above, where the lender reduced the amount lent to a borrower because of monitoring difficulties, could in fact be efficient in a constrained sense. The information problem may still have an efficiency cost tosociety, but from an operational point of view that cost has no relevance.The argument that problems in credit markets result in a lower level of output, and perhaps too much risk-taking relative to some ideal situation whereinformation is freely available, is frequently used to justify subsidized credit orthe establishment of government-owned banks in areas that appear to be poorly served by the public sector. This argument is a non sequitur and should beresisted whenever encountered. In thinking about market failure and constrained Pareto efficiency, the full set of feasibility constraints for allocating resources needs to be considered. In this article, market failure is taken to meanthe inability of a free market to bring about a constrained Pareto-efficient allocation of credit, in the sense defined above (see Dixit 1987 for a sample formal analysis). The rest of the article examines the implications of this concept.Applying the criterion of constrained Pareto efficiency narrows the field formarket failure, but it still leaves room for a fairly broad array of cases in whichresources could end up being inefficiently allocated. In the illustration of Paretoimprovement used above, only the well-being of the two individuals involvedin a trade was considered. But if externalities enter the picture in other words, if a third party is affected, possibly negatively, by the decision of theother two-a Pareto improvement is clearly not guaranteed, even if the twoprincipals are made better off. It is well known that markets operate inefficiently if there are externalities (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986 for a generaldiscussion), and specific types of externalities may particularly afflict creditmarkets. One important role for government policy to improve the working ofcredit markets is to deal impartially with externality problems
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