Conclusions
Thailand has the problem of managing migrants because its economic success enabled internal migrants who
once filled “3-D” jobs to find better opportunities in Thailand or abroad. Thai employers turned to migrants
from Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Cambodia to replace previous internal migrants as well as to fill newly-created
jobs in Thailand’s expanding economy. Migration policies were apparently based on the assumption that the
need for migrants would be short-lived, despite periodic re-registrations of migrants which demonstrated that
some locations, industries and occupations had become “structurally dependent” on migrants.
Thai authorities searching for durable migrant worker policies would be wise to remember that labour migration
is a process to be managed, not a problem to be solved. As long as Thailand is significantly richer than
neighbouring countries, there will be labour migration into Thailand.
In managing labour migration, it is important to remember that both Thai employers and migrant workers
prefer certainty to uncertainty. Extending work permits for only a year or two discourages employers from
training migrants and migrants from learning Thai and acquiring skills, since it is not clear whether there will be
future extensions. Granting work permits for three to five years would change employer and migrant incentives
and could promote more training and higher productivity.
A second challenge is to develop a flexible migration policy that recognizes the realities of particular sectors
that employ foreign workers. For example, many migrants in agriculture are not registered because they are
employed only seasonally in a low-wage sector, which makes the registration fee too high relative to earnings
to justify registration. The government has introduced more flexibility in border areas,45 but may have to expand
this flexibility further by, for example, supporting local initiatives that allow migrants to register at the village
level and shift from farm to farm. Similarly, fisheries present a special case, since migrants may be at sea
during registration periods.
International experience provides at least three lessons about managing labour migration. First, temporary
worker programmes tend to become larger and to last longer than anticipated, as employers and migrants
become mutually-dependent on one another. In order to avoid the “nothing more permanent than temporary
workers” outcome, economic incentives must reinforce the policy goal of reducing dependence on migrants
over time, rather than the usual case in which economic incentives are the opposite of programme rules.
Second, economic tools are available to align the interests of employers and migrants with policy goals. For
example, employers are more likely to pay registration fees if some of the funds are used to develop laboursaving
changes that raise productivity and improve competitiveness. Migrants are more likely to return at the
end of their work permits if they receive refunds of some of the fees they have paid.Third, international migration involves nationals of two nation states. Cooperation between governments of
countries sending and receiving migrants is needed to protect migrants and minimize smuggling and trafficking.
Sending countries can be encouraged to cooperate to prevent irregular migration and human trafficking by
opening legal channels for migrants, and remittances and return bonuses matched by international development
agencies can foster development in the areas of origin.