With the coup d’état of 22 May 2014, Thailand vaulted back to its familiar position as a cautionary tale. After much speculation, General Prayuth Chan-ocha announced that the military was, once again, in charge.
Since the second half of 2013 the opponents of former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra ran an effective and demoralising campaign against her government. And there were long worries that a coup — judicial, military or bureaucratic — would end Thailand’s flirtation with representative democracy.
Thailand has failed to build a stable consensus about how to distribute political and economic power. And powerful interests, including in the palace and the army, don’t respect electoral mandates.
The royal family itself deserves some of the blame for this situation. During the twilight of King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s unprecedented 68-year reign, at a time when the institution needed to unite the people, it has taken sides in an unbecoming battle for political dominance — and democratic voices identify palace aides as their enemies. Republican attitudes, which had been largely dormant since the 1980s, are re-emerging.
If things go badly wrong, Thailand — one of the most successful societies in Asia and comfortable with its positive international and regional standing — could topple from its perch.
Crucially, Thailand demonstrates that there can be serious repercussions when democratic elections bring a changing of the guard. The government of deposed former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the older brother of former prime minister Yingluck, which held power from 2001 until the coup of 2006, represented an uncomfortable challenge to the old order of royal, military and bureaucratic authority.
Thaksin’s interpretation of Thai politics was brash, economically boastful and wildly popular. The army and the palace couldn’t accept the prestige that Thaksin accumulated, or the way he so profitably blurred the boundaries between business and politics.
Thaksin threatened to comprehensively displace those he consistently defeated at the ballot box. The coup of 19 September 2006 was the response to his electoral success and the years since have witnessed the tough struggle to re-define Thai democracy.
Thaksin’s allies still win every election, most recently in February 2014, though it is fair to judge that neither side is unblemished.
This is a profound issue for democrats across Southeast Asia — the nature of elite interests means that those who win elections often hold fundamentally undemocratic perspectives. Even though Thaksin has led political parties and a social movement that are emboldened by support from the masses, and partly by the rhetoric of social inclusion and economic redistribution, his primary focus remains the accumulation of power.