ABSTRACT
Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not
have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showing
that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the
same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that
both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3)
adoption is not always in the best interest of actual
people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth
abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all
the cases where abortion is, including cases where the
newborn is not disabled.
INTRODUCTION
Severe abnormalities of the fetus and risks for the
physical and/or psychological health of the woman
are often cited as valid reasons for abortion.
Sometimes the two reasons are connected, such as
when a woman claims that a disabled child would
represent a risk to her mental health. However,
having a child can itself be an unbearable burden for
the psychological health of the woman or for her
already existing children,
1
regardless of the condi-
tion of the fetus. This could happen in the case of
a woman who loses her partner after she finds
out that she is pregnant and therefore feels she will
not be able to take care of the possible child by
herself.
A serious philosophical problem arises when the
same conditions that would have justified abortion
become known after birth. In such cases, we need
to assess facts in order to decide whether the same
arguments that apply to killing a human fetus can
also be consistently applied to killing a newborn
human.
Such an issue arises, for example, when an
abnormality has not been detected during preg-
nancy or occurs during delivery. Perinatal asphyxia,
for instance, may cause severe brain damage and
result in severe mental and/or physical impair-
ments comparable with those for which a woman
could request an abortion. Moreover, abnormalities
are not always, or cannot always be, diagnosed
ABSTRACTAbortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do nothave anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showingthat (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have thesame moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact thatboth are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3)adoption is not always in the best interest of actualpeople, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birthabortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in allthe cases where abortion is, including cases where thenewborn is not disabled.INTRODUCTIONSevere abnormalities of the fetus and risks for thephysical and/or psychological health of the womanare often cited as valid reasons for abortion.Sometimes the two reasons are connected, such aswhen a woman claims that a disabled child wouldrepresent a risk to her mental health. However,having a child can itself be an unbearable burden forthe psychological health of the woman or for heralready existing children,1regardless of the condi-tion of the fetus. This could happen in the case ofa woman who loses her partner after she findsout that she is pregnant and therefore feels she willnot be able to take care of the possible child byherself.A serious philosophical problem arises when thesame conditions that would have justified abortionbecome known after birth. In such cases, we needto assess facts in order to decide whether the samearguments that apply to killing a human fetus canยัง มีอย่างต่อเนื่องกับฆ่าทารกมนุษย์ปัญหาดังกล่าวเกิดขึ้น เช่น เมื่อมีพบความผิดปกติในระหว่างแผง - ไม่nancy หรือเกิดขึ้นในระหว่างการจัดส่ง Asphyxia ปริกำเนิดตัวอย่าง อาจทำให้สมองเสื่อมอย่างรุนแรง และทำผลรุนแรงทางกายภาพ หรือจิต-ments เปรียบเทียบกับผู้ที่เป็นผู้หญิงสามารถร้องขอการแท้ง นอกจากนี้ ความผิดปกติไม่เสมอ หรือไม่สามารถจะเป็น การวินิจฉัย
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