Such policies should help alleviate the perceived complexity of security requirements, particularly for nontechnical staff. Organizations can also combat security-related complexity with periodic security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs that convey the latest security knowledge and technical skills. In an effort to reduce uncertainty toward security requirements, SETA programs can include a component that describes the current regulatory landscape and upcoming security policy changes (administrative and technical) so that employees can prepare to assimilate them into their work routines. Organizations can also involve employees in the design and implementation of security requirements as a means to reduce SRS. Examples include testing of new security requirements, providing feedback to management, and communicating security changes to coworkers.
Note 1
In the present study, we extend the technostress concept to the domain of IS security and explain three conditions—overload, complexity, and uncertainty—in which security requirements can create stress in employees. We theorize that this form of employee stress, termed security-related stress (SRS), is a contributor to ISP violations. (line 33-37 , pp 286)
Note 2
We develop and empirically test a model of ISP violation intention which predicts that employees engage in emotion-focused coping in response to SRS. We explicate this emotion-focused coping in the form of cognitive rationalization processes drawn from moral disengagement theory. In this manner of coping, employees respond to SRS by disengaging their internal selfsanctions related to ISP violations, which in turn increases their ISP violation intention. (line 38-40 , pp 286/line 1-4, pp 287)
Note 3
The results support our multidimensional view of SRS2—which consists of security-related overload, complexity, and uncertainty—as a set of workplace environment factors that foster noncompliant user behavior, while extending prior work on employee rationalizations of ISP violations and the role of sanctions in security compliance decisions. (line 7-11 , pp 287)