Pound (1988), however, presents three alternative hypotheses with respect to the relation between shareholding by institutional investors and corporate value. He examines proxy contests in which dissident shareholders own far less than controlling interests in their firms and hence need to borrow voting rights of other shareholders to impose particular policy or personnel changes. In doing so, Pound (1988) investigates the role that large informed institutional shareholders play and whether they have economic incentives to make the voting process efficient. The efficient monitoring hypothesis contends that the larger the shareholding of the institutional shareholder the more efficient the monitoring exerted by that shareholder and the higher the likelihood of dissident success. On the other hand the strategic alignment and conflictof-interest hypotheses state that large institutional shareholders maintain strategic alliances with the incumbent management and will be swayed in their voting behaviour by their existing relationship with the management, implying a lower likelihood of dissident success in proxy contests. Hence the first hypothesis (efficient monitoring) predicts a positive relation whereas the remaining two hypotheses (conflict-of-interest and strategic alignment) predict a negative relation between corporate value and institutional shareholding. Thus, the few studies that exist provide mixed evidence on the effect of institutional shareholding on the value of the firm.