This article contributes to current CG literature in
several ways. We show that board structure plays a
key role among the internal CG mechanisms. The
broader attributes we use to proxy board independence
allow a substitution effect among boardindependence
attributes. We show that, although
incentive alignment would improve CG, a more
independently structured board of directors may be
most valuable to investors in markets with concentrated
ownership. For our methodological contribution,
we combine variables quantitatively using PCA,
in contrast to most prior research, which uses equal
weighting or binary variables in index formation. We
also demonstrate the difference between the PCA
combined index and the simple constructed index,
and that formation of indices using PCA may retain
more information of the individual attributes. In
addition, we address the problem of endogeneity by
using industry averages as instruments and show that
the general results remain intact.
This article contributes to current CG literature inseveral ways. We show that board structure plays akey role among the internal CG mechanisms. Thebroader attributes we use to proxy board independenceallow a substitution effect among boardindependenceattributes. We show that, althoughincentive alignment would improve CG, a moreindependently structured board of directors may bemost valuable to investors in markets with concentratedownership. For our methodological contribution,we combine variables quantitatively using PCA,in contrast to most prior research, which uses equalweighting or binary variables in index formation. Wealso demonstrate the difference between the PCAcombined index and the simple constructed index,and that formation of indices using PCA may retainmore information of the individual attributes. Inaddition, we address the problem of endogeneity byusing industry averages as instruments and show thatthe general results remain intact.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
