It was hard to know therefore how to interpret the post-1999 flow of capital within the
eurozone from high to low per capita income and productivity countries. Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2002) noted early on that while savings–investment correlations fell sharply
with the advent of the euro, there existed two quite different interpretations of the
associated intra-eurozone imbalances. The positive interpretation was that investment
finance was flowing to the low-income countries of the eurozone periphery because they
were the economies with the most scope for rapid productivity growth. The negative
interpretation in contrast saw capital as flowing toward problem countries riddled by
domestic distortions – bubble-driven asset booms, excessive budget deficits and unrealistic
expectations of future growth – and resulting in excessive levels of public- andprivate-sector consumption, rather than the putative investment boom. Alan Walters
(1986) had warned of this possibility long before the advent of monetary union: he pointed
to the danger that the low-income countries of the European periphery with relatively high
inflation rates but now suddenly the same nominal interest rates as their high-income
partners would ‘enjoy’ relatively low real interest rates, giving them every incentive to
borrow, whether for reasons good or bad.