for LDC governments to change foreign exchange rates, interest rates, wages, and
other prices to equilibrium prices, which would make planning less cumbersome and
time consuming and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.
Chapter 9 discussed how to decrease factor price distortions by (1) cutting wages
and fringe benefits, (2) reducing interest rate subsidies, and (3) increasing the price of
foreign exchange to an equilibrium rate. Yet price distortions are difficult to remove.
Low elasticities of demand for urban labor may limit how much wage reductions
expand employment (see Chapter 9). Increased foreign exchange prices (say, from
Rs. 13 = $1 to Rs. 26 = $1) will not improve the balance of trade (exports minus
imports of goods) if sums of the export and import demand elasticities are too low.
An inelastic demand for an LDC’s exports results in only a modest increase in rupee
export receipts, which may not compensate for the increase in rupee import payments
from inelastic import demand (that is, a relatively small quantity decline in response
to the relatively large rupee price increase from the increased foreign exchange price).
In LDCs, import demand elasticity is often low as a result of high tariffs, extensive
quantitative and other trade restrictions, and exchange controls.
Moreover, equilibrium prices may conflict with other policy goals. The LDC governments
may not want to weaken labor unions’ ability to protect the rights and
shares of workers against powerful employers. Subsidized capital may be part of a
government plan to promote local enterprise. Young, growing debtor nations borrowing
capital to increase future productivity (for example, the United States and
Canada in the late 19th century) may not be able to attain a foreign exchange rate
that eliminates an overall balance of payments deficit.
Furthermore, existing distortions may be supported by economic interests too
powerful for government to overcome. These interests may include organized labor,
local enterprises receiving subsidies, industries competing with imports, firms favored
with licensed foreign inputs, industrial and import licensing agencies, and central
banks.
The LDC governments may be faced with a choice between the Scylla of cumbersome
shadow price calculations and the Charybdis of factor price modification.
Although the case for adjusting LDC prices nearer to their equilibrium rate is strong,
the technical and political obstacles to doing so are often formidable.