Companies’ earnings are expected to be more conservative after managers stop overstating. In addition to this passive,
definitional increase in conservatism, managers and directors of restating companies have strong incentives to actively
ensure that post-restatement earnings are conservative, in order to repair their reputations for good management and
corporate governance (Farber, 2005).1 In additional analyses we investigate the extent to which our test companies engage
in changes to corporate governance and whether changes often viewed as improvements in governance are associated
with greater increases in earnings conservatism. Using both Basu’s DT metric and the C-Score metric, we observe a
pronounced increase in conservatism for firms that experience improved corporate governance, consistent with results
previously documented by Ahmed and Duellman (2007).
Companies’ earnings are expected to be more conservative after managers stop overstating. In addition to this passive,definitional increase in conservatism, managers and directors of restating companies have strong incentives to activelyensure that post-restatement earnings are conservative, in order to repair their reputations for good management andcorporate governance (Farber, 2005).1 In additional analyses we investigate the extent to which our test companies engagein changes to corporate governance and whether changes often viewed as improvements in governance are associatedwith greater increases in earnings conservatism. Using both Basu’s DT metric and the C-Score metric, we observe apronounced increase in conservatism for firms that experience improved corporate governance, consistent with resultspreviously documented by Ahmed and Duellman (2007).
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