Buddhism, or other traditional forms of Buddhism, that could be considered
straightforward, systematic works of moral philosophy” (Gowans,
Buddhist Moral Philosophy 54). This means Western scholars, in particular,
have only recently begun to analyze important Buddhist moral concepts,
leaving room for both misunderstanding and progress.
My next response is to emphasize how closely related the Nirodha
View is to the standard Nirvāṇa View. By overemphasizing the positive
aspects of nirvāṇa, scholars have managed to miss the central role that
the cessation of suffering plays not only in the Buddha’s teaching, but
also in Buddhist axiology. The third noble truth is about the cessation of
suffering, but it is easy, as we have seen, to conflate the cessation of suffering
(nirodha)
with
final
liberation
(nirvāṇa).
The Nirodha View also makes room for the importance of nirvāṇa
in two significant ways. The first is that nirvāṇa-in-this-life is an ideal
state (and counts as a regulative ideal toward which all might aspire) because
it is a state wherein one has eliminated one’s own suffering. The
cessation and elimination of suffering are what make nirvāṇa valuable.
The second way the Nirodha View makes room for nirvāṇa is that parinirvāṇa
becomes a spiritual and moral achievement in virtue of being the
complete cessation of suffering. So, according to the Nirodha View, nirvāṇa
can
even
remain
a
regulative
ideal
for
Buddhists—the
end
at
which
they
aim—but
we
should
understand
nirvāṇa
in
terms
of
the
cessation
of
suffering.
Anything positive we can say about nirvāṇa is related to the cessation
and elimination of suffering. Why is someone who has achieved
nirvāṇa-in-this-life compassionate and wise? The answer is that compassion
and wisdom are reliable correctives to suffering. Why is parinirvāṇa
“neither black nor white?” The answer is that, when we can no longer
aptly describe reality in conventional terms, the language of morality
itself ceases to apply. Why is parinirvāṇa unconditioned, even though all