2.8 The prediction of shipping cycles
So it looks as though the investor who wants to make a return of more than 4–5 per
cent per annual must be prepared to take ‘shipping risk’—or, if we put it in simple
terms, to take a gamble. The problem is to find a decision strategy for dealing with
the cycles we have discussed at such length. One obvious strategy is to exploit the
volatility of freight rates by taking a position based on the expected development
of the cycle. The strategy described, for example, by Alderton44 is to spot charter
on a rising market and, when the peak is reached, to sell or take a time charter long
enough to carry the vessel through the trough. Ship acquisitions are made at the
bottom of the market when ships are ‘cheap’.45 Few would argue with the principle
of buying low and selling high. The skill lies in the execution. Most analysts have
been caught out too often to believe they can forecast accurately. However there is
some middle ground.
First we must restate the truth so evident from shipping history, that cycles are
not ‘cyclical’ if by this we mean ‘regular’.46 In the real world shipping cycles are a
loose sequence of peaks and troughs. Because the timing of each stage in the cycle
is irregular, simple rules like the ‘seven year cycle’, although statistically correct
over a very long period, are far too unreliable to be a worthwhile decision criteria.
However, the cycles are not random and Cufley’s conclusion that ‘it is totally
impossible to predict when the market will move upwards (or fall)’ is probably too
extreme. Our review in this chapter of the last twelve cycles demonstrates that the
same explanations of cyclical peaks and troughs appear again and again. Economic
conditions, the ‘business cycle’, trade growth and the ordering and scrapping of
ships are the fundamental variables which can be analysed, modelled and
extrapolated. Careful analysis of these variables removes some, but not all, of the
uncertainty and reduces the risk. To these must be added the ‘wild cards’ which
triggered the spectacular markets. The South African War in 1900, closure of the
Suez Canal, stockbuilding, congestion, strikes in the shipyards have all played a
part.
The difficulty of analysing these factors is daunting. The world economy is
complex and we often have to wait years for the detailed statistics which tell us
precisely what happened. Many of the variables and relationships in the model are
highly unpredictable, so the prediction process should be seen as reducing risk
rather than creating certainty. In this respect shipowners are in much the same
position as other specialist commodity markets traders. Those playing the market
must try to understand the cycles and take a risk. That is what they are paid for. An
essential part of weighing up this risk is to form a realistic view of what is driving
each stage in the cycle. Reading the signs as the market progresses through the
stages in the cycle, extrapolating the consequences and, when the facts support it,
being prepared to act against market sentiment. It is not necessary to be completely
right. What matters is being more right than other traders. There is a long history
of ill-advised shipping investments which, over the years, have provided a welcome
source of income for more experienced investors who buy ships cheap during
recessions and sell expensively during booms.
2.8 The prediction of shipping cycles
So it looks as though the investor who wants to make a return of more than 4–5 per
cent per annual must be prepared to take ‘shipping risk’—or, if we put it in simple
terms, to take a gamble. The problem is to find a decision strategy for dealing with
the cycles we have discussed at such length. One obvious strategy is to exploit the
volatility of freight rates by taking a position based on the expected development
of the cycle. The strategy described, for example, by Alderton44 is to spot charter
on a rising market and, when the peak is reached, to sell or take a time charter long
enough to carry the vessel through the trough. Ship acquisitions are made at the
bottom of the market when ships are ‘cheap’.45 Few would argue with the principle
of buying low and selling high. The skill lies in the execution. Most analysts have
been caught out too often to believe they can forecast accurately. However there is
some middle ground.
First we must restate the truth so evident from shipping history, that cycles are
not ‘cyclical’ if by this we mean ‘regular’.46 In the real world shipping cycles are a
loose sequence of peaks and troughs. Because the timing of each stage in the cycle
is irregular, simple rules like the ‘seven year cycle’, although statistically correct
over a very long period, are far too unreliable to be a worthwhile decision criteria.
However, the cycles are not random and Cufley’s conclusion that ‘it is totally
impossible to predict when the market will move upwards (or fall)’ is probably too
extreme. Our review in this chapter of the last twelve cycles demonstrates that the
same explanations of cyclical peaks and troughs appear again and again. Economic
conditions, the ‘business cycle’, trade growth and the ordering and scrapping of
ships are the fundamental variables which can be analysed, modelled and
extrapolated. Careful analysis of these variables removes some, but not all, of the
uncertainty and reduces the risk. To these must be added the ‘wild cards’ which
triggered the spectacular markets. The South African War in 1900, closure of the
Suez Canal, stockbuilding, congestion, strikes in the shipyards have all played a
part.
The difficulty of analysing these factors is daunting. The world economy is
complex and we often have to wait years for the detailed statistics which tell us
precisely what happened. Many of the variables and relationships in the model are
highly unpredictable, so the prediction process should be seen as reducing risk
rather than creating certainty. In this respect shipowners are in much the same
position as other specialist commodity markets traders. Those playing the market
must try to understand the cycles and take a risk. That is what they are paid for. An
essential part of weighing up this risk is to form a realistic view of what is driving
each stage in the cycle. Reading the signs as the market progresses through the
stages in the cycle, extrapolating the consequences and, when the facts support it,
being prepared to act against market sentiment. It is not necessary to be completely
right. What matters is being more right than other traders. There is a long history
of ill-advised shipping investments which, over the years, have provided a welcome
source of income for more experienced investors who buy ships cheap during
recessions and sell expensively during booms.
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