Initial understanding in biological systematics
Segregating understanding into three distinct classes when speaking of biological systematics provides a way to indicate the internested relations that exist in systematics research. In other words, there tends to be a three-tier system of inquiry: (1) descriptive understanding, in the form of observation statements, is a consequence of our desire to attain understanding of sense data by way of the existence of objects with particular properties, and that level of understanding naturally leads to (2) sets of questions answerable by proximate causes, given that we routinely observe individuals at different points in their life history, and (3) with observations among groups of organisms there are additional questions to which a variety of ultimate causes can be applied.
The process of acquiring causal understanding in biological systematics
The previous two sections outlined what is required to proceed from sense data to three general classes of understanding via inferences of explanatory hypotheses. The last section ended with the observation that some authors in biological systematics have developed a protocol that falsely claims to move ultimate understanding forward by actions that are not valid test procedures. The nature of this confusion will be addressed in part in this section. The subsequent section will examine common approaches to evaluating phylogenetic hypotheses, either in the context of testing or stipulating evidential support.
Conclusions
Scientific understanding occurs by way of explanation through the fitting of observations into some broader theoretical framework, not only by offering initial information about possible causes but also through the ability to anticipate and investigate consequences related to those causes as matters of critical evaluation. Understanding is also context dependent in that it is a state of mind contingent on what individuals regard as being sufficient for meeting their standard of understanding. What provides an adequate explanation for one individual might be unsatisfactory to another. As a result, some yardstick by which to judge the adequacy of understanding is required. Surely any modicum of consensus on the adequacy of hypotheses in the sciences should come from the extent to which results from empirical testing are manifested. Therein lay two problems for biological systematics. Ultimate hypotheses, especially specific and phylogenetic, are often devoid of causal details, such that the state of understanding, beyond the initial explanatory notions presented under the rubric of ‘taxa’ or cladograms are neither pursued nor enhanced. Even if these hypotheses are filled out to the point that valid test predictions can be stipulated, it is likely that actual testing will be impractical in nearly all instances, as noted earlier. Instead, critical assessments of hypotheses are stalled, such that there is the tendency to orient back to original character observations, such as interesting correlations among features, or pursuing investigations of the finer structural components of characters (descriptive) or their ontogenetic development (proximate). In other words, the general reaction is to move backward in an epistemic sense to consider the enhancement of descriptive and proximate understanding, rather than actually pursuing ultimate understanding in terms of critical hypothesis assessment. Taken at face value, there is nothing wrong with such a maneuver, but we do need to be cognizant that enhancing descriptive or proximate understanding does nothing to promote continued ultimate understanding as conceived as testing in the sciences. Several of the classes of systematics hypotheses fail to provide substantive growth in causal understanding for the fact that our tendency is to maneuver away from testing those hypotheses.
Initial understanding in biological systematicsSegregating understanding into three distinct classes when speaking of biological systematics provides a way to indicate the internested relations that exist in systematics research. In other words, there tends to be a three-tier system of inquiry: (1) descriptive understanding, in the form of observation statements, is a consequence of our desire to attain understanding of sense data by way of the existence of objects with particular properties, and that level of understanding naturally leads to (2) sets of questions answerable by proximate causes, given that we routinely observe individuals at different points in their life history, and (3) with observations among groups of organisms there are additional questions to which a variety of ultimate causes can be applied.The process of acquiring causal understanding in biological systematicsThe previous two sections outlined what is required to proceed from sense data to three general classes of understanding via inferences of explanatory hypotheses. The last section ended with the observation that some authors in biological systematics have developed a protocol that falsely claims to move ultimate understanding forward by actions that are not valid test procedures. The nature of this confusion will be addressed in part in this section. The subsequent section will examine common approaches to evaluating phylogenetic hypotheses, either in the context of testing or stipulating evidential support.บทสรุปScientific understanding occurs by way of explanation through the fitting of observations into some broader theoretical framework, not only by offering initial information about possible causes but also through the ability to anticipate and investigate consequences related to those causes as matters of critical evaluation. Understanding is also context dependent in that it is a state of mind contingent on what individuals regard as being sufficient for meeting their standard of understanding. What provides an adequate explanation for one individual might be unsatisfactory to another. As a result, some yardstick by which to judge the adequacy of understanding is required. Surely any modicum of consensus on the adequacy of hypotheses in the sciences should come from the extent to which results from empirical testing are manifested. Therein lay two problems for biological systematics. Ultimate hypotheses, especially specific and phylogenetic, are often devoid of causal details, such that the state of understanding, beyond the initial explanatory notions presented under the rubric of ‘taxa’ or cladograms are neither pursued nor enhanced. Even if these hypotheses are filled out to the point that valid test predictions can be stipulated, it is likely that actual testing will be impractical in nearly all instances, as noted earlier. Instead, critical assessments of hypotheses are stalled, such that there is the tendency to orient back to original character observations, such as interesting correlations among features, or pursuing investigations of the finer structural components of characters (descriptive) or their ontogenetic development (proximate). In other words, the general reaction is to move backward in an epistemic sense to consider the enhancement of descriptive and proximate understanding, rather than actually pursuing ultimate understanding in terms of critical hypothesis assessment. Taken at face value, there is nothing wrong with such a maneuver, but we do need to be cognizant that enhancing descriptive or proximate understanding does nothing to promote continued ultimate understanding as conceived as testing in the sciences. Several of the classes of systematics hypotheses fail to provide substantive growth in causal understanding for the fact that our tendency is to maneuver away from testing those hypotheses.
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