Awareness that a person did not provide feedback reduced a
shift toward stricter criteria elicited in the reliable source group
in Experiment 1 (Hypothesis 3). Our finding of less conser-
vative criteria among aware versus unaware participants sup-
ports the idea that belief in the reliable source induced adop-
tion of stricter response styles. Unaware participants were
Table 3 Experiment 2: Mean (and standard deviation) unequal-variance decision criterion and accuracy estimates for the aware participants and the
aware and unaware participants combined, across tests and groups
Lax–Neutral–Strict Strict–Neutral–Lax Combined
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Reliable: Aware
Hit .73 (.11) .73 (.11) .61 (.21) .66 (.12) .70 (.13) .72 (.12) .69 (.12) .71 (.12) .71 (.12)
False alarm .30 (.14) .38 (.11) .31 (.13) .17 (.10) .24 (.12) .33 (.10) .23 (.13) .31 (.13) .32 (.11)
ca –.01 (.30) –.17 (.24) .11 (.37) .20 (.28) .09 (.31) –.05 (.27) .09 (.30) –.04 (.30) .02 (.34)
Az .78 (.09) .75 (.08) .69 (.16) .78 (.13) .79 (.07) .77 (.05) .78 (.11) .77 (.08) .73 (.12)
Reliable: Aware and Unaware Combined
Hit .78 (.10) .76 (.11) .56 (.21) .63 (.17) .70 (.13) .72 (.12) .71 (.15) .72 (.13) .64 (.19)
False alarm .32 (.18) .36 (.11) .25 (.12) .15 (.08) .23 (.10) .33 (.10) .24 (.16) .29 (.12) .29 (.11)
ca –.14 (.32) –.18 (.20) .27 (.41) .25 (.30) .12 (.33) –.05 (.27) .06 (.37) –.03 (.31) .11 (.38)
Az .79 (.11) .78 (.10) .69 (.15) .78 (.13) .79 (.07) .77 (.05) .79 (.12) .78 (.09) .73 (.12)
Fig. 5 The biased feedback manipulation was successful across tests
among unaware participants, but only in the first two tests for the aware
group
Mem Cogn (2015) 43:695–708 705
slightly stricter than the aware in Test 3, with no criterion
differences for the first two tests.
Placement in the LNS or SNL groups qualified the rela-
tionship between awareness and test. For unaware partici-
pants, the biased feedback manipulation was successful across
the three memory tests: LNS and SNL participants always
differed in their criterion placements. Among aware partici-
pants, the LNS and SNL groups differed in the first and
second tests, but not the third. Aware participants were told
that a person did not provide their feedback; they were never
explicitly told that the feedback itself had been manipulated.
Suspicion aroused from awareness of the source manipulation
might have been enough to reduce the strength of the biased
feedback manipulation altogether. Indeed, awareness of de-
ception in one experiment had corresponded with persistence
of suspicion over time (Epley & Huff, 1998). Work building
on Solomon Asch’s (1956) classic conformity paradigm that
has indicated that suspicion reduces the conformity effect
(Stricker et al. 1967) illustrates this idea. Awareness of decep-
tion in one aspect of an experiment (i.e., the “social” source)
could create suspicion across the paradigm.