The pegged exchange rate arrangements posed much greater problems in 1997, when
governments ran down their foreign exchange reserves to defend pegged currencies that were
increasingly judged by the markets to be unsustainable. As the reserves ran down, vulnerability to
financial panic increased. Looking over the course of the 1990s, we can say that Asia=s pegged
exchange rates posed at least three problems. First, they gave over-confidence to investors, who
ignored exchange risks on the belief that nominal exchange rates would be pegged indefinitely, or
at least long enough to allow for a graceful exit. Second, they permitted a growing overvaluation
in real terms, thereby squeezing exporters, and drawing too much investment spending into nontradeables
sectors. Third, they set the stage for financial panic, since Asian governments were
committed by their public promises to use the foreign exchange reserves to defend the currency,
even after everybody came to regard the rate as overvalued. This promise forced governments to
deplete their foreign reserves in a vain defense of the currency, and then it forced them to Abreak
their word@ when they had to abandon the currency defense once the foreign exchange reserves
are depleted.