What else can be learned from the finding that perception and action are social in nature? The obvious conclusion is that specific perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes are dedicated to social interaction. This seems to be the currently dominant view in the new field of social cognitive neuroscience. This approach has led to important progress, because it is now possible to map social behavior to particular cognitive and brain functions. However, we suggest that a deeper understanding of the processes supporting social interaction might be achieved if one takes the more radical stance that the demands of social interaction have shaped perception, action, and cognition (Fiske, 1992) through and through (Smith & Semin, 2004).
In particular, reassessing perception, action planning, and motor control in the light of their potential social roots might reveal that functions traditionally considered hallmarks of individual cognition originated through the need to interact with others. For instance, humans’ ability to perform two tasks at the same time could be supported by processes that originally enabled individuals to perform one task while monitoring another individual’s task performance. Along these lines, Roepstorff and Frith (2004) have speculated that the homunculus who has plagued psychology from its beginnings might be exorcized through a social exegesis. The hidden controller of our actions might be nothing more than an internalized other giving commands. Further exploration of how perception, action, and cognition are grounded in social interaction might have the potential to turn social cognitive neuroscience into a coherent framework that is more than the sum of its parts.
What else can be learned from the finding that perception and action are social in nature? The obvious conclusion is that specific perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes are dedicated to social interaction. This seems to be the currently dominant view in the new field of social cognitive neuroscience. This approach has led to important progress, because it is now possible to map social behavior to particular cognitive and brain functions. However, we suggest that a deeper understanding of the processes supporting social interaction might be achieved if one takes the more radical stance that the demands of social interaction have shaped perception, action, and cognition (Fiske, 1992) through and through (Smith & Semin, 2004).In particular, reassessing perception, action planning, and motor control in the light of their potential social roots might reveal that functions traditionally considered hallmarks of individual cognition originated through the need to interact with others. For instance, humans’ ability to perform two tasks at the same time could be supported by processes that originally enabled individuals to perform one task while monitoring another individual’s task performance. Along these lines, Roepstorff and Frith (2004) have speculated that the homunculus who has plagued psychology from its beginnings might be exorcized through a social exegesis. The hidden controller of our actions might be nothing more than an internalized other giving commands. Further exploration of how perception, action, and cognition are grounded in social interaction might have the potential to turn social cognitive neuroscience into a coherent framework that is more than the sum of its parts.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
