The decline in post-issue operating performance can be expected if the firms cannot
generate pre-IPO levels of positive NPV projects or if managers fail to maintain the
required levels of capital expenditures. Alternatively, positive NPV projects may have
negative earnings early, so that operating performance declines while investment is
occurring. To investigate this possibility on Thai IPO firms, we examine sales growth,
asset turnover (sales/TA), and capital expenditures to determine if they can explain the
declining performance.
In Table 2, we show that sales of IPO firms significantly increase over the 4 years after
the firm goes public. Sales increase relative to the industry median as well. Although asset
turnover (sales/TA) decreases over time, the change relative to the industry is not
significant. Capital expenditures during the post-IPO period appear to decline, particularly
in Year 0, but the industry-adjusted result also shows that these declines are generally not
significant. Overall, our evidence suggests that changes in sales levels and capital
expenditure levels do not fully explain the inferior post-IPO operating performance. We
next turn to ownership structure as a possible explanation.
4.2. Managerial ownership and operating performance
If significant managerial-ownership is an effective way to align incentives between
managers and shareholders, then a going-public firm that retains a significant portion of its
original owners may suffer a less severe post-IPO decline in performance. However, if
manager-owners value perquisite consumption in lieu of value-maximizing endeavors, then
their existence may exacerbate the decline in post-IPO firm performance. Prior research
finds that both effects can exist, but that each can occur at different ownership levels.
Therefore, in a regression methodology where the dependent variable is the change in
operating performance from before the IPO to after the IPO, we test various forms of insideownership
as explanatory variables. Specifically, we consider a linear relationship between
managerial ownership (alpha) and the change in performance, and we also consider two
nonlinear relationships: a quadratic form (where alpha is squared) and a cubic form (where
alpha is cubed). Including the latter form, which follows Short and Keasey (1999), allows for
three levels of managerial ownership to have an effect on firm performance, while allowing
the managerial-ownership turning points to be determined by the data. Additionally, we
include control variables in our regressions. The three models to be tested are as follows
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