Finally, being a ‘pure renter’ has a negative and significant
influence on the continued participation. A possible interpretation
is that renters most likely have fewer incentives than do
owners in increasing the economic returns from their crops, as
higher margins could ultimately be captured by land owners
through land rental increases. This result is potentially
problematic for the durability of the Q-GAP program, as 45%
of farmers nationwide are renting the land they are cultivating;
this trend is particularly true for the central plains (Molle and
Sanjintr 2000). This result is also likely to be related to the fact
that pure renters are also more inclined to sub-contract
farming activities such as pesticide application to labourers,
and are therefore less concerned about the effect of farming ill
practices on their own health. Another possible interpretation
is that farmers are most likely less concerned with environmental
issues when the land does not belong to them.