There are a number of countries where we can witness a negative slope in the market. And the curve steepness is also steeper in peripheral markets compared to core sectors.
This does not yet say anything about the absolute level of covered-sovereign spread that is acceptable to
investors. We have had new issues price in the primary markets at high double-digit basis points through
sovereign debt. We are thus not talking about illiquid secondary screen prices that do not represent reality. We
have however compressed in ASW spread terms and pricing deeply through the sovereign if ASW spreads are
still above 100bp and differences to other core markets in high double-digit basis points territory is something else than if ASW spreads are around mid-swaps flt. In the former case investors could still hope for spread
compression of the affected covered bonds vs. swaps and other covered bond sectors, something that is harder
to achieve in the current context.
It is important to note that not all investors focus on the spread to local sovereign debt. Similar to some senior unsecured investors not caring much about covered bond levels and buying at very tight spreads relative
to covered bonds, there are investors that will not focus on the spread to sovereign debt. They might have
a narrow covered bond mandate not allowing for sovereign debt to be added or they might focus more on
alternatives in credit space. For these accounts the spreads relative to other covered bond markets or senior
unsecured debt might be more relevant. There are also investors that might not agree with the rationale for
or the extent of the negative spreads to sovereigns but are literally forced into buying covered bonds even
at deeply negative spread levels. Asset managers receiving fresh cash inflws that do not want to fall behind
their benchmark weights while not wanting to hold too much cash at negative rates might invest as well even
at deeply negative spreads.
The biggest focus on the covered bond to sovereign debt relationship can probably be found amongst bank
treasuries and more generally domestic investors. For many of them the sovereign is still the relevant benchmark and buying into products that produce a signifiant negative carry vs. the own benchmark is problematic.
What we can say from anecdotal evidence in any case is that investor demand outside the CBPP 3 clearly diminishes at negative spreads to sovereigns in 5Y core sectors such as France. In peripheral markets, we have
seen private sector investor buying activity continue until levels of around up to -50bp vs. underlying sovereign debt for the top names in 5Y. Inside these levels the almost exclusive buyer that remains is the CBPP3.