mother? This lack of balance is at the heart of the moral dilemma – one among the
many of the sensitive moral issues which technological developments arise.
The equity of relationship may be one of equality of background and
understanding, or it may be one of equality of information. In the former case one
might imagine an accountant and a solicitor entering a contract. Both are well qualified
professionals, and both understand the need for advice from other professionals. One
gaining at the expense of the other is seen as a matter of acumen rather than morals.
An inequitable case would be that of (say) an art expert, approached by a poorly
sighted old person selling a picture she believes to be of no special value, whereas the
art dealer knows it to be worth a great deal of money, but does not reveal its true worth.
In this case there is an inequality of background and an inequality of information. Our
moral sense is offended because of the uneven contest. There are two principles here.
One is the equality of interlocutaries; the other is the equality of information.
Our sense of morals seems to require that we have a sense of equity of both before
we agree that a decision is a moral one. Ideally a fair judgement should be between well
informed equals and it is the absence of that equity that arouses our concern. If
everyone were to act according to the loftiest ideals, and with warmth and goodwill, no
such guidance would be necessary. Given that we need such guides, with simplicity of
application, this one of equity of relationship has much to commend it. Here a cautious
note is to be inserted. It has been pointed out by various writers, notably Moore (1903),
one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. One cannot, in other words, derive a moral
statement from a non-moral (e.g. naturalistic-objective) statement. Moral precepts
cannot be empirically or scientifically tested or verified and are unique in their own
class. Nevertheless, one may still argue that equitability is a principle that may be
considered to be a moral one. This is not to say that it is derived from an “is” but,
rather, that it is worthy of consideration as a principle in morality.