include instructions about coaching, sport
participation, officiating, facilities and other
relevant programmes. Given the strength of
the resource dependence, the GSS enforces
conditions on the operation of NSOs that
constantly increases the external control of
their behaviour and performance and signi
cantly limits their organizational choice.
The qualitative information testies to an
increasing involvement by the GSS in sportrelated
activities with poorly dened programme
authority. This involvement
undermines the legitimate role of NSOs in
supervising the sport concerned and forces
them to operate in a larger system of relations,
which produces external control and
uncertainty. In this larger system, as Scott
and Meyer (1991: 139) point out, institutional
processes usually dominate over technical
arrangements and result in ‘. . . more elaborated
and extensive control systems and, in
consequence, more complex administrative
components in the constituent organisational
units’.
An interesting nding is to note the complete
lack of planning in both the high
performance and development sectors of the
NSOs (see Table 1, V11 and V12) and the
outdated written rules and regulations determining
their operation (V10). The majority of
the NSOs are not currently involved in specifying
long-term actions and objectives and in
formalizing their internal operation. This
nding is directly associated with the NSOs’
effort to cope with the institutional uncertainty
stemming from the lack of a clearly
stated resource distribution policy
In relation to this, DiMaggio and Powell
(1991) suggest that organizations facing similar
environmental conditions tend to exhibit
the same behaviour and structures. Furthermore,
the results of Slack and Hinings
(1994) support empirically the emergence of
identical organizational changes in sport
organizations, which stems from systematic
institutional pressures for more professional
and bureaucratic operations. On the other
include instructions about coaching, sport
participation, officiating, facilities and other
relevant programmes. Given the strength of
the resource dependence, the GSS enforces
conditions on the operation of NSOs that
constantly increases the external control of
their behaviour and performance and signi
cantly limits their organizational choice.
The qualitative information testies to an
increasing involvement by the GSS in sportrelated
activities with poorly dened programme
authority. This involvement
undermines the legitimate role of NSOs in
supervising the sport concerned and forces
them to operate in a larger system of relations,
which produces external control and
uncertainty. In this larger system, as Scott
and Meyer (1991: 139) point out, institutional
processes usually dominate over technical
arrangements and result in ‘. . . more elaborated
and extensive control systems and, in
consequence, more complex administrative
components in the constituent organisational
units’.
An interesting nding is to note the complete
lack of planning in both the high
performance and development sectors of the
NSOs (see Table 1, V11 and V12) and the
outdated written rules and regulations determining
their operation (V10). The majority of
the NSOs are not currently involved in specifying
long-term actions and objectives and in
formalizing their internal operation. This
nding is directly associated with the NSOs’
effort to cope with the institutional uncertainty
stemming from the lack of a clearly
stated resource distribution policy
In relation to this, DiMaggio and Powell
(1991) suggest that organizations facing similar
environmental conditions tend to exhibit
the same behaviour and structures. Furthermore,
the results of Slack and Hinings
(1994) support empirically the emergence of
identical organizational changes in sport
organizations, which stems from systematic
institutional pressures for more professional
and bureaucratic operations. On the other
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