This subindex contains
three variables: (1) percentage of directors’ shareholdings.
A higher percentage should improve directors’
monitoring activities, because the directors have
more cash-flow rights in the firm. Consistent with this
idea, Donker et al. (2009) find that firms with higher
levels of managerial shareholdings are less likely to
experience financial distress; (2) ratio of variable
compensation to base compensation; and (3) if there
exists an executive share-option scheme. These measures
represent the pay-to-performance sensitivity for
the executive. Higher pay-performance sensitivity
provides incentives that may lead the executive to
perform better in the short term. Superior payperformance
sensitivity would be attractive to a
more competent person who is deciding whether or
not to take on an executive role. Also, Bayless (2009)
finds a significant positive association between
executive compensation and the subsequent realized
stock returns. The formulation of this variable is
in line with Cordeiro et al. (2007), who find that
using the director stock option enhances firm value,
particularly for firms with higher investment
opportunity and weaker external-monitoring
mechanisms.4