Even the communist victory in China in October 1949 was no seen entirely within the prism of the Cold War and containment. The theme of the American Government’s white paper was that the communist success was the result of deep-seated upheavals within the country. It hardly fitted the purpose of the Truman Doctrine of supporting “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation b armed minorities or by outside pressure’. In this letter of transmittal to Congress, Acheson seemingly contradicted his department’s argument by asserting that part of a larger purpose, or strategy, of seeking to bring about a split between the two communist giants by playing on Chinese nationalist sentiment. It was envisaged that the historical legacy of Russian imperialism combined with the Soviet incapacity to meet Chinese needs of external economic support would lead to a rift. Such thinking at this stage implied a more flexible approach than that ordinarily associated with containment. Indeed, the American government was even prepared to contemplate the conquest of Taiwan and the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and his remnant forces by the Chinese communist. There was also the prospect that the United State would recognize the People’s Republic of China before long. Acheson also played on the theme of Sono-Soviet national difference in his speech of 12 January 1950, while Mao Zedong was negotiating a new partnership in Moscow.