He suggested that these problems generally reflected an inadequate appreciation of the American consumer, counseling that the American head of household is “as precise about each dollar that he takes from his hand as a strand of hair . . . [and] who will not put out any money . . . until the matter has been looked into [in] all its details and pedantries”,59 and correspondingly, “It is our responsibility to be ready with the full details, checked and
verified . . . every change that comes out later . . . hurts our credibility . . . that the institution is not serious, and discourages participation.”60 Further, the organization was short-staffed and did not have the critical man-power to respond to the questions and demands of potential participants. Nonetheless, Hollander did offer effusive praise for a Gush Emunim liaison in
New York, whose efforts were “worth its weight in gold”.61 In closing, he offered a series of practical and technical improvements in the effort to “make Operation 1000 an indivisible part of the life and future of Israel and become an impetus of great importance in encouraging immigration in future years.”62