In this sector, the state-owned Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) has always been protected by the government and allowed to maintain a monopoly over both electricity generation and distribution. Despite previous attempts to reform the sector, weak regulation, a lack of regulatory oversight, and little domestic competition have persisted and enabled EGAT to exert significant power over the country’s electricity development (Matthews 2012). EGAT drafts Thailand’s Power Development Plan (PDP) in a closed and non-participatory process (Greacen and Bijoor 2007). Further, Thailand’s cost-plus tariff system guarantees that EGAT earns revenues based on the amount of electricity it sells, and allows EGAT to pass the costs of over-investment to consumers by raising tariffs. This incentive spurs continual expansion in the system and a penchant to overstate demand (Greacen and Palettu 2007), which it has done for the past 20 years.3 Civil society groups have protested that this incentive scheme promotes developing large-scale electricity projects rather than renewable energy investments and energy efficiency policies (ibid.). These investments increase both EGAT’s influence in the electricity sector, and its profits, so it keeps on wanting to expand. Consequently, the current incentive structure promotes excessive investments.