THE NATURE OF ART
“objectified pleasure”---are fallacious, either because, while true of art, they are also true of much that is not art, and hence fail to differentiate art from other things; or else because they neglect some essential aspect of art. Art is itself so complex a fact that a satisfactory definition of if must also be complex, that is to say, must involve many characteristics. As the mathematicians would say, the characteristics must be not only necessary but sufficient. They must penetrate deep enough into the roots of art to meet the challenge of the pluralists and show that there is, after all, a significant sameness in all the arts,--despite their differences in technique and media,--connecting the fine with the applied arts, so far as the latter are beautiful, and the realistic with the fanciful and the idyllic. The other deduction is that however sharply art is differentiated from life, its deep connection with life must be revealed in any definition. This is the enduring truth under-lying all criticism of the ivory tower. With these lessons from history in mind, I shall now briefly explain how I think a good account of art may be framed. I begin with a truism, that a work of art has value; or, in other words, that if is a source of satisfaction. For a work of art is not a given thing. Like a star or a tree, but a thing made by man, and for his pleasure. And I wish further to premiss that all value, as satisfaction, arises through the appeasement of what in a general way may be called desire. Desire in the broad sense in which I am using is at once the motivation of all experience, its inward drive, and the source of its value. And the truth underlying the opposition to every type of theory of art’s sake is the fact that the substance of the aesthetic experience is the same as the sub-stance of all experience of the aesthetic experience, a satisfaction that is the result of the appeasement of identical desires. Almost any desire that urges man on in life reappears in his art. There are no peculiar elementary aesthetic interests or emotions. What is different is the mode by which desire is appeased. For while, in ordinary experience, desire is occupied with real objects and is satisfied through a course of action leading to a goal that involves interaction with the real environment physical or social, in the case of art, desire is directed upon immanent or fictitious objects, and is appeased, not through a course of action leading to a goal, but in present, given experience. This mode of satisfying desire I call satisfaction in the imagination. Such a use of the term imagination has been criticized on the ground that aesthetic appreciation is not always concerned with images or fictions, but in the case of music, or the color and line patterns of a picture, with sensory material. But such criticism betrays ignorance of the long use of the term in exactly the sense in which I am employing it in the history of critical writing. For
ลักษณะของศิลปะ“objectified pleasure”---are fallacious, either because, while true of art, they are also true of much that is not art, and hence fail to differentiate art from other things; or else because they neglect some essential aspect of art. Art is itself so complex a fact that a satisfactory definition of if must also be complex, that is to say, must involve many characteristics. As the mathematicians would say, the characteristics must be not only necessary but sufficient. They must penetrate deep enough into the roots of art to meet the challenge of the pluralists and show that there is, after all, a significant sameness in all the arts,--despite their differences in technique and media,--connecting the fine with the applied arts, so far as the latter are beautiful, and the realistic with the fanciful and the idyllic. The other deduction is that however sharply art is differentiated from life, its deep connection with life must be revealed in any definition. This is the enduring truth under-lying all criticism of the ivory tower. With these lessons from history in mind, I shall now briefly explain how I think a good account of art may be framed. I begin with a truism, that a work of art has value; or, in other words, that if is a source of satisfaction. For a work of art is not a given thing. Like a star or a tree, but a thing made by man, and for his pleasure. And I wish further to premiss that all value, as satisfaction, arises through the appeasement of what in a general way may be called desire. Desire in the broad sense in which I am using is at once the motivation of all experience, its inward drive, and the source of its value. And the truth underlying the opposition to every type of theory of art’s sake is the fact that the substance of the aesthetic experience is the same as the sub-stance of all experience of the aesthetic experience, a satisfaction that is the result of the appeasement of identical desires. Almost any desire that urges man on in life reappears in his art. There are no peculiar elementary aesthetic interests or emotions. What is different is the mode by which desire is appeased. For while, in ordinary experience, desire is occupied with real objects and is satisfied through a course of action leading to a goal that involves interaction with the real environment physical or social, in the case of art, desire is directed upon immanent or fictitious objects, and is appeased, not through a course of action leading to a goal, but in present, given experience. This mode of satisfying desire I call satisfaction in the imagination. Such a use of the term imagination has been criticized on the ground that aesthetic appreciation is not always concerned with images or fictions, but in the case of music, or the color and line patterns of a picture, with sensory material. But such criticism betrays ignorance of the long use of the term in exactly the sense in which I am employing it in the history of critical writing. For
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