Despite these caveats, BHS’s representation and ensuing results remain relevant, as
these may well reflect the reference points and outcomes of incentive systems in practice.
But the specific combination of design characteristics of the objective information system
affects the generalizability of its effects. The same holds for the framing of the discretionary
power of the supervisor. As discussed before, the framing of adjustments “as you see
fit” as opposed to more purposeful descriptions of the discretion, may impact fairness considerations.
Hence, results may depend on the form of subjectivity (Bailey, Hecht, and
Towry 2011; H€oppe and Moers 2011). A broad discretion by adjusting bonus amounts as
BHS investigate could more easily be perceived as biased or unjustified. Full discretion
over the bonus pool can lead superiors to consider noncontractible information to a lesser
extent than partial discretion, as the latter makes the available bonus more saliently earmarked
for adjustments for uncontrollable factors (Bailey et al. 2011). Adjustments within
systems incorporating relevant subjective measures (innovation, adaptation), or multiple
measures weighted ex post based on information regarding external factors and managerial
actions (H€oppe and Moers 2011), could also be perceived as fairer. The same holds
when the purpose of subjective assessments is clearly communicated throughout the organization
and/or explicitly included in the initial bonus calculation method.