POLICY MAKERS CAN TAKE SEVERAL STEPS TOWARD PREVENTING FUTURE CREDIT BUBBLES
Our analysis has several implications for policy makers and regulators seeking to ease the deleveraging process and enhance future financial market stability.
First, history shows that policy makers can enable healthy deleveraging by supporting GDP growth through multiple channels. Many historic examples, from the United States in the 1930s to Japan in 1997, show the danger of withdrawing support of the economy too soon. However, faced with large increases in public debt, many governments face an acutely difficult decision on how long to provide support and when to curtail public spending.
Additionally, our analysis shows that the right tools could have identified the unsustainable buildup of leverage in pockets of several economies in the years leading up to the crisis. Policy makers should work toward developing a robust system for tracking leverage at a granular level across countries and over time. Ideally, an international body should be tasked with collecting the data from individual countries. These data can inform macroprudential policies, as well as provide
inputs into the risk models of banks and nonfinancial corporations. A revised Basel II framework could require banks to adjust their internal risk weights to reflect levels of leverage in the relevant sector of the real economy. Central banks, too, could use this information: although it may be difficult to identify asset bubbles based on price
movements, the growth and nature of leverage may serve as a good proxy and could inform monetary policy.
Finally, policy makers should revisit the numerous incentives for borrowing, especially in real estate markets. This includes tax breaks for mortgages, as the United States provides, and other policies as well, because we observed high levels of household debt in Canada and the United Kingdom, which lack such tax incentives. Many governments provide subsidies and other programs to encourage home ownership. And multiple policies provide tax advantages and other incentives that induce companies to issue debt rather than equity. Certainly, ample credit is needed for
the growth of modern, developed economies. But excessive borrowing, especially combined with loose lending standards, can cause serious harm to individual households, companies, and the broader financial system. Therefore, as part of longer term reform of the global financial system, it would be valuable to reassess the incentives that may contribute to excessively high leverage.
Business executives also will face challenges during the deleveraging process. An environment of tighter and more costly credit will alter the viability of some business models and the attractiveness of certain types of investments. With the household sectors likely to deleverage in several countries, consumption will probably grow more slowly than before the crisis, causing spending patterns to shift. Business leaders will need flexibility to respond to such changes
At this writing, the deleveraging process has barely begun. Each week brings news of another country straining under the burden of too much debt or impending bank losses from over-indebted companies. The bursting of the great global credit bubble is not over yet. Just as worrisome is the fact that deleveraging is likely to be a significant component of the postcrisis recovery, which would dampen growth.
Nevertheless, by learning lessons from historic experiences of deleveraging, today’s policy makers may be better able to steer a course through these challenging waters