It remains to be seen how the new political environment that has been brought about in Thailand
as a result of the September 2006 army coup and subsequent institution of a civilian-led
government under the People’s Power Party (PPP) will affect Bangkok’s overall response to
the insurgency. Encouragingly, General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, who orchestrated the military
takeover and who was instrumental in appointing new members of an interim administration,
immediately signaled that he was ready to negotiate with rebels in the south. Just as significant,
his designated prime minister, Surayud Chulanont, issued a public apology for past hard-line
government policies and, in November 2006, specifically affirmed that Islamic law should be
given a bigger role in the south and explicitly recognized the need for a long-term strategy that
combines three main strands: (1) reconciliation, (2) security (split 50/50 between hard and soft
approaches), and (3) dialogue.1 These various gestures represented an abrupt change in tack
from the policies of the previous Thaksin administration, which consistently refused to engage
in talks with the insurgents, much less grant them concessions.2 At the time of this writing,
this broad-based policy mix remained in place under the PPP