Productivity growth is a precondition for increasing standards of living and maintaining competitiveness in the globalised economy. The productivity gap that separates poor and rich countries has never been as wide as it is today. Poor countries in particular need to emphasise productivity growth in order to alleviate poverty. Although the private sector is undoubtedly the main driver of economic growth, governments, too, can help accelerate structural change towards more competitive and higher-value activities. This is what industrial policy is about. For this study, we define ‘industrial policy’ as any government measure, or set of measures, to promote or prevent structural change in ways that the government views as desirable.
Industrial policy can be classified either as functional or selective. Functional policies aim at shaping the framework conditions for the whole enterprise sector - e.g. through improving macroeconomic stability, upgrading general infrastructure (like electricity generation capacity) or reforming the legal framework for business. Selective policies, in contrast, point at specific industries, sectors, regions or firms using subsidies, tariffs, taxes and tax exemptions, targeted infrastructure facilities and targeted business development services to foster technological learning or to build up industry-specific marketing or export service companies.
Many scholars now acknowledge that selective industrial policy can work well in countries with strong merit-based public services and political checks and balances. Opinions diverge widely, however, with regard to the role of industrial policies - especially selective policies - in low and lower-middle income countries. These countries typically have weak institutions, poorly developed administrative capacities and a shortage of public and private financial capital. Hence, even if it is clear that low and lower middle income countries are faced with particularly severe market failures that justify applying selective industrial policies, there is a big question about the ability of governments to intervene in markets so as to increase public welfare.
There are very few empirical studies available that analyse industrial policies in low and lower-middle income countries. Most case studies focus on the old industrialised countries or on success stories from the newly industrialised countries. This study about industrial policy in Mozambique intends to help fill this gap. It is part of a comparative research project that includes other country cases from the developing world (see Altenburg 2011). The purpose of the study is to describe Mozambique’s main challenges to structural transformation, its governance structures in the field of industrial policy, and - most importantly - to assess the quality of industrial policies and industrial policy making in Mozambique.
Mozambique is recovering from the ravages of a long struggle for independence from Portugal that was followed by a protracted civil war. At the end of the 1980s the government abandoned socialism, underwent a structural adjustment programme and established a market-based economy. During the past 15 years, Mozambique’s development has been marked by peace and stability, falling poverty rates and high macroeconomic growth.
Nevertheless, it is still one of the poorest countries in the world and the government budget is largely dependent on official development assistance (ODA).
We conclude that the GOM’s strategic capability for industrial policy management lacks the vision and leadership needed to define an appropriate mix between investment climate improvements - to create the conditions for private investments and market ompetition - and targeted interventions - to accelerate productivity growth and to enhance firms’ competitiveness.
The donors are crucial policy players in Mozambique, but they are unable to compensate for these weaknesses because they are not a homogeneous group that advocates for one main strategic line of action. Many of them have followed an approach inspired by the ‘Washington Consensus’ that disregarded selective measures: For them, ndustrial policy is not a field of intervention with priority. In most cases in which donors support selective measures in particular projects, these are limited in scale, scope and time, and often do not incorporate government planning and learning cycles.
In Mozambique there is an urgent need for policies that foster broad-based sustainable economic development and generate income and jobs for its population. The remarkable macroeconomic growth rates are in large part explained by huge capital-intensive foreign direct investment (FDI) projects that add very few jobs to the economy, by the inflow of ODA and by the very low level of initial gross domestic product (GDP). The vast majority of Mozambicans are not connected to the few profitable and high-value-creating economic enclaves, and instead work in subsistence farming, or in mostly informal or noncompetitive small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Linkages between firms are poorly developed and there are very few domestic firms that succeed in supplying high-end domestic markets or export markets. Well-designed and well-coordinated industrial policy could thus constitute a crucial instrument to foster much-needed, broad-based economic growth. Among the sectors that are regarded as potential growth sectors are agriculture and agro-industry, tourism, mining and energy. Our results, however, show a huge gap between the need for welfare-enhancing industrial policies and the capability of the government to design and implement them.
Several governance features weaken the government’s industrial policy management capability: The strong dominance of a single party Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) blurs the boundaries between it and the government, and weakens checks and balances. This is compounded by very close ties between party cadres and leading businesses (several party cadres direct important business groups that they acquired during the privatisation process); weak civil-society organisations; the lack of an independent judiciary; and corruption. Moreover, either business associations are weak or they lack strong bases; only now are think tanks being developed. Finally, there are only a few very weak cross-sectoral coordination platforms to coordinate policies between line ministries and different levels of government, and between the private sector and the government.
Both on paper and in practice functional industrial policies are more elaborated and more prominent than selective industrial policies, for instance, trade liberalisation and privatisation reforms, general FDI promotion, and reforms to make regulations more businessfriendly and improve the general business climate, including access to finance. In contrast, selective industrial approaches are less palpable. The Government of Mozambique (GOM) does not follow a clear strategy of outlining and guiding targeted selective policies to foster the competitiveness of local enterprises, such as developing specific technological capabilities or creating agglomeration economies and other spillovers that would enable local enterprises to take advantage of the market enhancement achieved through functional policies.
Two selective industrial policies that do stand out are analysed in greater detail in this study: the promotion of the cashew industry and the promotion of linkages between a huge FDI project, the MOZAL aluminium smelter, and local SMEs. Although we have found partial successes, no far-reaching development effects are discernable from these approaches.
Our investigation confirms several of the structural deficiencies of the economy and of governance weaknesses that have already been pointed out. The partial successes found in the two case studies - for cashews, they involved the founding of an export service company and the supply of overseas markets, and for linkage promotion they involved the establishment of a number of backward linkages between MOZAL and local SMEs, along with (technological) upgrading of these SMEs - are limited in scope and substantially due to the strategic advice and practical support of specific donor projects.
The Government’s attitude towards industrial policy is more reactive to the interests of big investors and donors than it is proactive or strategic. We base this assessment on our observation that the policy measures and projects that are enacted and implemented are those backed by the coherently and clearly articulated interests of investors (such as investment promotion law, big FDI projects in the energy and mining sector) or of donors (liberalisation, privatisation and Doing-Business-style reforms, which were supported by a coalition of powerful donor organisations).
In contrast, more complex industrial policy approaches - such as regarding SME promotion - that demand an active government role in providing strategic direction, building coalitions with enterprises, financial institutions, local governments and donors, facilitating or building coordination platforms, etc. only exist on paper and don’t have the drive needed to be implemented on a relevant scale. This pattern can partly be explained by the low technical capacity and institutional development of the State Administration, the weak formal organisation of the local private sector - especially small enterprises - and high aid-dependency. The latter creates incentives for the Government to focus primarily on keeping high levels of aid flows in order to secure political legitimacy by high spending levels in the social sectors, and thus to neglect - in relative terms - engaging in an active industrial policy.
Furthermore, widespread corruption leads to poor enforcement of measures intended to foster local industry (such as the tax on raw cashewnut exports), in the lack of transparency in awarding contrac
เจริญเติบโตของผลผลิตเป็นเงื่อนไขสำหรับการเพิ่มมาตรฐานของที่อยู่อาศัย และรักษาศักยภาพในการแข่งขันในเศรษฐกิจ globalised ช่องว่างผลผลิตที่แยกประเทศยากจน และรวยไม่เคยมีความกว้างเป็นวันนี้ ประเทศที่ยากจนจำเป็นต้องย้ำผลผลิตเจริญเติบโตเพื่อบรรเทาความยากจนโดยเฉพาะ แม้ว่าภาคเอกชนจะไม่ต้องสงสัยไดรเวอร์หลักของเศรษฐกิจ รัฐบาล เกินไป ช่วยเร่งการเปลี่ยนแปลงโครงสร้างสู่กิจกรรมแข่งขันมากขึ้น และสูงค่า นโยบายอุตสาหกรรมใดกำลังได้ สำหรับการศึกษานี้ เรากำหนด "นโยบายอุตสาหกรรม' เป็นวัดใด ๆ รัฐบาล หรือชุดของการวัด การส่งเสริม หรือป้องกันการเปลี่ยนแปลงโครงสร้างที่รัฐบาลมองเป็นต้องนโยบายอุตสาหกรรมสามารถจัดประเภท เป็นหน้าที่ หรืองาน นโยบายการทำงานมุ่งสร้างรูปร่างเงื่อนไขกรอบสำหรับองค์กรทั้งภาค - เช่นผ่านการปรับปรุงเสถียรภาพ ปรับปรุงโครงสร้างพื้นฐานทั่วไป (เช่นกำลังผลิตติดตั้งไฟฟ้า) หรือการปฏิรูปกรอบทางกฎหมายสำหรับธุรกิจ เลือกนโยบาย คมชัด จุดที่เฉพาะเจาะจง ภาค ภูมิภาค หรือบริษัทที่ใช้เงินอุดหนุน ภาษีศุลกากร ภาษี และภาษี exemptions สิ่งอำนวยความสะดวกโครงสร้างพื้นฐานการกำหนดเป้าหมาย และเป้าหมายของธุรกิจบริการพัฒนา เพื่อส่งเสริมการเรียนรู้เทคโนโลยี หรือเพื่อสร้างตลาดเฉพาะอุตสาหกรรม หรือบริษัทที่ให้บริการส่งออกนักวิชาการจำนวนมากขณะนี้ยอมรับว่า นโยบายอุตสาหกรรมใช้ได้ดีในประเทศแข็งแกร่งโดยบุญสาธารณะบริการตรวจสอบทางการเมือง และยอดดุล ความคิดเห็น diverge อย่างกว้างขวาง อย่างไรก็ตาม เกี่ยวกับบทบาทของนโยบายอุตสาหกรรม -โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งมาตรการนโยบาย - ในประเทศที่มีรายได้ต่ำ และปานกลาง ระดับล่าง ประเทศเหล่านี้มักจะมีสถาบันอ่อนแอ บริหารกำลังพัฒนาไม่ดี และขาดทุนทางการเงิน และเอกชน ดังนั้น แม้ว่ามันจะล้างที่ต่ำ และรายได้ปานกลางที่ประเทศกำลังประสบกับความล้มเหลวอย่างรุนแรงโดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งตลาดที่ใช้นโยบายอุตสาหกรรมใช้ชิดขอบล่าง มีคำถามใหญ่เกี่ยวกับความสามารถของรัฐบาลเข้าแทรกแซงในตลาดเพื่อเพิ่มสวัสดิการสาธารณะมีน้อยมากรวมศึกษาว่างวิเคราะห์นโยบายอุตสาหกรรมในประเทศที่มีรายได้ต่ำ และล่างกลาง ส่วนใหญ่กรณีศึกษาโฟกัสประเทศ industrialised เก่า หรือเรื่องราวความสำเร็จจากประเทศ industrialised ใหม่ ศึกษาเกี่ยวกับนโยบายอุตสาหกรรมในโมซัมบิกมีจุดมุ่งหมายเพื่อช่วยให้มีช่องว่าง เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของโครงการวิจัยเปรียบเทียบที่มีกรณีประเทศอื่นจากประเทศกำลังพัฒนา (ดู Altenburg 2011) วัตถุประสงค์ของการศึกษาคือการ อธิบายความท้าทายหลักของโมซัมบิกเพื่อการเปลี่ยนแปลงโครงสร้าง โครงสร้างการกำกับดูแลกิจการในฟิลด์นโยบายอุตสาหกรรม และ - สำคัญ - การประเมินคุณภาพของนโยบายอุตสาหกรรมและนโยบายอุตสาหกรรมทำในโมซัมบิกMozambique is recovering from the ravages of a long struggle for independence from Portugal that was followed by a protracted civil war. At the end of the 1980s the government abandoned socialism, underwent a structural adjustment programme and established a market-based economy. During the past 15 years, Mozambique’s development has been marked by peace and stability, falling poverty rates and high macroeconomic growth.Nevertheless, it is still one of the poorest countries in the world and the government budget is largely dependent on official development assistance (ODA).We conclude that the GOM’s strategic capability for industrial policy management lacks the vision and leadership needed to define an appropriate mix between investment climate improvements - to create the conditions for private investments and market ompetition - and targeted interventions - to accelerate productivity growth and to enhance firms’ competitiveness.The donors are crucial policy players in Mozambique, but they are unable to compensate for these weaknesses because they are not a homogeneous group that advocates for one main strategic line of action. Many of them have followed an approach inspired by the ‘Washington Consensus’ that disregarded selective measures: For them, ndustrial policy is not a field of intervention with priority. In most cases in which donors support selective measures in particular projects, these are limited in scale, scope and time, and often do not incorporate government planning and learning cycles.In Mozambique there is an urgent need for policies that foster broad-based sustainable economic development and generate income and jobs for its population. The remarkable macroeconomic growth rates are in large part explained by huge capital-intensive foreign direct investment (FDI) projects that add very few jobs to the economy, by the inflow of ODA and by the very low level of initial gross domestic product (GDP). The vast majority of Mozambicans are not connected to the few profitable and high-value-creating economic enclaves, and instead work in subsistence farming, or in mostly informal or noncompetitive small and medium enterprises (SMEs).Linkages between firms are poorly developed and there are very few domestic firms that succeed in supplying high-end domestic markets or export markets. Well-designed and well-coordinated industrial policy could thus constitute a crucial instrument to foster much-needed, broad-based economic growth. Among the sectors that are regarded as potential growth sectors are agriculture and agro-industry, tourism, mining and energy. Our results, however, show a huge gap between the need for welfare-enhancing industrial policies and the capability of the government to design and implement them.ลักษณะการทำงานกำกับดูแลต่าง ๆ ลดลงความสามารถในการบริหารนโยบายอุตสาหกรรมของรัฐบาล: ปกครองที่แข็งแกร่งของเดียวพรรค Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) blurs ขอบระหว่างมันและรัฐบาล และอ่อนเช็ค และสมดุล นี้จะเพิ่มตามความสัมพันธ์ที่ดีระหว่าง cadres บุคคลและธุรกิจชั้นนำ (หลายฝ่าย cadres ตรงกลุ่มธุรกิจที่สำคัญที่พวกเขาได้รับในระหว่างกระบวนการ privatisation); องค์กรภาคประชาสังคมอ่อนแอ การขาดอำนาจตุลาการเป็นอิสระ และความเสียหาย นอกจากนี้ สมาคมธุรกิจจะอ่อนแอ หรือพวกเขาขาดฐานแข็งแรง เท่าคิดว่าถังพัฒนาขึ้น ในที่สุด มีเพียงไม่กี่ประสานงานข้ามรายสาขาอ่อนมากแพลตฟอร์มประสานงานนโยบาย ระหว่างบรรทัดทบวงกรมและระดับต่าง ๆ ของรัฐบาล และ ระหว่างภาคเอกชนและรัฐบาลBoth on paper and in practice functional industrial policies are more elaborated and more prominent than selective industrial policies, for instance, trade liberalisation and privatisation reforms, general FDI promotion, and reforms to make regulations more businessfriendly and improve the general business climate, including access to finance. In contrast, selective industrial approaches are less palpable. The Government of Mozambique (GOM) does not follow a clear strategy of outlining and guiding targeted selective policies to foster the competitiveness of local enterprises, such as developing specific technological capabilities or creating agglomeration economies and other spillovers that would enable local enterprises to take advantage of the market enhancement achieved through functional policies.Two selective industrial policies that do stand out are analysed in greater detail in this study: the promotion of the cashew industry and the promotion of linkages between a huge FDI project, the MOZAL aluminium smelter, and local SMEs. Although we have found partial successes, no far-reaching development effects are discernable from these approaches.Our investigation confirms several of the structural deficiencies of the economy and of governance weaknesses that have already been pointed out. The partial successes found in the two case studies - for cashews, they involved the founding of an export service company and the supply of overseas markets, and for linkage promotion they involved the establishment of a number of backward linkages between MOZAL and local SMEs, along with (technological) upgrading of these SMEs - are limited in scope and substantially due to the strategic advice and practical support of specific donor projects.The Government’s attitude towards industrial policy is more reactive to the interests of big investors and donors than it is proactive or strategic. We base this assessment on our observation that the policy measures and projects that are enacted and implemented are those backed by the coherently and clearly articulated interests of investors (such as investment promotion law, big FDI projects in the energy and mining sector) or of donors (liberalisation, privatisation and Doing-Business-style reforms, which were supported by a coalition of powerful donor organisations).In contrast, more complex industrial policy approaches - such as regarding SME promotion - that demand an active government role in providing strategic direction, building coalitions with enterprises, financial institutions, local governments and donors, facilitating or building coordination platforms, etc. only exist on paper and don’t have the drive needed to be implemented on a relevant scale. This pattern can partly be explained by the low technical capacity and institutional development of the State Administration, the weak formal organisation of the local private sector - especially small enterprises - and high aid-dependency. The latter creates incentives for the Government to focus primarily on keeping high levels of aid flows in order to secure political legitimacy by high spending levels in the social sectors, and thus to neglect - in relative terms - engaging in an active industrial policy.Furthermore, widespread corruption leads to poor enforcement of measures intended to foster local industry (such as the tax on raw cashewnut exports), in the lack of transparency in awarding contrac
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