The evidence in favor of the panic interpretation in Asia is both indirect and direct. The
indirect evidence has two main parts. First, the crisis was unanticipated, suggesting that it can not
be easily explained by fundamentals. Almost no one who was closely watching Asia in the months
before the crisis, even those who were deeply familiar with Asia=s flaws, predicted an economic
meltdown. Second, even ex post, it is hard to find fundamental explanations commensurate with
the depth of the crisis. The problems that Asia=s critics now point to should have led to a growth
slowdown, or even a recession, not a deep contraction and implosion of both the banking and
corporate sectors.
The evidence in favor of the panic interpretation in Asia is both indirect and direct. Theindirect evidence has two main parts. First, the crisis was unanticipated, suggesting that it can notbe easily explained by fundamentals. Almost no one who was closely watching Asia in the monthsbefore the crisis, even those who were deeply familiar with Asia=s flaws, predicted an economicmeltdown. Second, even ex post, it is hard to find fundamental explanations commensurate withthe depth of the crisis. The problems that Asia=s critics now point to should have led to a growthslowdown, or even a recession, not a deep contraction and implosion of both the banking andcorporate sectors.
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