We explore the nature of the information asymmetry between managers and
market participants by studying share price behavior after the announcement
of common stock and convertible debt offerings that subsequently are com- pleted as well as offerings that subsequently are cancelled. A striking finding of
our study is that completed offerings are associated with a positive return
between the announcement and issuance and a negative return at the issuance.
Conversely, cancelled offerings are followed by a negative return between the
announcement and the cancellation and a positive return at the cancellation.
The patterns of returns from the offering announcement through the issuance
or cancellation are consistent with the argument that managers try to
issue securities that are overpriced, and that market participants understand
managers’ incentive. It appears that the market’s response to the announcement
does not eliminate the difference between the market’s and managers’
assessments of share value. Rather, the negative price reaction at the issuance
and the positive price reaction at the cancellation suggest that a divergence of
opinion about share price exists at the outcome of the offering as well.