Those officials who handle classified material must have the necessary security clearances. The security of information is enhanced if classified material is only accessible to those who need to know it. These principles are generally applied by all governments. Especially sensitive to breaches of security regulations is the cable room that contains the embassy’s cipher system. The ciphers and the machines that apply them are highly classified material and therefore need rigorous and constant protection. It is the duty of the administrative section to ensure the security of these installations.
It is safe to assume that classified material is occasionally mishandled. The Indyk case provides some insight into this matter. In September 2000, Martin S. Indyk, US Ambassador to Israel, was relieved of his post and his security clearance was lifted, because he had allegedly mishandled classified materials. He was accused of having used an unclassified computer for writing classified documents and of having taken classified documents home to work on them. Apparently, this practice was common among US diplomats at that time. During the subsequent security crackdown the promotion of more then 200 senior State Department officials was frozen. Finally, on October 11, 2000 Ambassador Indyk’s security clearance and his status as Ambassador to Israel were restored. Lapses of security regulations must be fought, but perhaps not in the drastic way the State Department handled the Indyk case. As long as no secrete are disclosed, a policy of reminding the foreign service staff of correct procedures might do.