At corporate level, when this group dynamic is present, participants in the same market are
seen to be exhibiting identical behaviour. As the scale and widespread nature of the financial
crisis became apparent, particularly the common acute problems of illiquidity and capital
inadequacy of banks investing in the same markets, it has been suspected that forces were
present which had led to both excessive and identical “group thinking”. While it was initially
assumed that investment decisions had reflected rational behaviour based on an assessment
of all available information in an intelligent efficient manner, a contrasting view evolved. It
is believed that at times investment was driven by group psychology which weakened the
link between the rigorous assessments of data and informed rational decision making. Board
decisions were not made in a vacuum. They will have been keenly aware of the investments
of their competitors, and the profits being realised as a result of those investments. It will
have been impossible for them not to be influenced by banks in the same market. If the first
investors in a new class of assets profit from rising asset values, as other investors learn about
the innovation, more may follow their example, driving the price even higher as they rush to
buy, in hopes of similar profits. If such “herd behaviour” causes prices to spiral up far above
the true value of the assets, a crash may become inevitable. If for any reason the price briefly
falls, so that investors realise that further gains are not assured, then the spiral may go into
reverse, with price decreases causing a rush of sales, reinforcing the decrease in prices.
At corporate level, when this group dynamic is present, participants in the same market areseen to be exhibiting identical behaviour. As the scale and widespread nature of the financialcrisis became apparent, particularly the common acute problems of illiquidity and capitalinadequacy of banks investing in the same markets, it has been suspected that forces werepresent which had led to both excessive and identical “group thinking”. While it was initiallyassumed that investment decisions had reflected rational behaviour based on an assessmentof all available information in an intelligent efficient manner, a contrasting view evolved. Itis believed that at times investment was driven by group psychology which weakened thelink between the rigorous assessments of data and informed rational decision making. Boarddecisions were not made in a vacuum. They will have been keenly aware of the investmentsof their competitors, and the profits being realised as a result of those investments. It willhave been impossible for them not to be influenced by banks in the same market. If the firstinvestors in a new class of assets profit from rising asset values, as other investors learn aboutthe innovation, more may follow their example, driving the price even higher as they rush tobuy, in hopes of similar profits. If such “herd behaviour” causes prices to spiral up far abovethe true value of the assets, a crash may become inevitable. If for any reason the price brieflyfalls, so that investors realise that further gains are not assured, then the spiral may go intoreverse, with price decreases causing a rush of sales, reinforcing the decrease in prices.
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