Waltz’s assumptions about states in the state of nature are wrong. Wendt argues it is wrong to assume that states in the state of nature face a “stag hunt” or “security dilemma.” States in the state of nature before their first encounter with another state cannot yet have ideas of self and of others. Wendt argues that “Because states do not have conceptions of self and other, and thus security interests, apart from or prior to interaction, we assume too much about the state of nature if we concur with Waltz that, in virtue of anarchy, “international political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of the self – regarding unit.” We also assume too much if we argue that, in virtue of anarchy, states in the state of nature necessarily face a “stag hunt” or security dilemma.” States cannot behave selfishly because they have not yet been subjected to an environment where it is necessary for them to do so. Because they have not yet interacted with other states, they cannot yet behave selfishly. Wendt strengthens his argument by adding that it is wrong to assume states in the state of nature have “selfish identities and interests” because “they would have no experience upon which to base such definitions of self and other.” Furthermore, to assume that states in the state of nature do possess the qualities, which Waltz believes that they do, “is to attribute to states in the state of nature qualities that they can only possess in society. This point emphasizes Wendt’s argument that “self – help is an institution, not a constitutive feature of anarchy.”