facing emerging market economies, and the role of various types of financial claims in the onset of
financial panic.
It is also important to note that for countries operating on pegged exchange rates, a panic
by domestic investors can also deplete foreign exchange reserves, and thereby precipitate a
financial crisis. For example, holders of sight deposits in the banking system, or domestic holders
of treasury bills, might decide suddenly to convert their domestic assets into foreign exchange,
thereby draining the foreign exchange reserves at the central bank (such, after all, is the classic
framework for understanding a balance of payments crisis). The Brazilian government, for
example, owes about $250 in domestic debt (with an average maturity of about seven months),
and redemptions of these notes have added to the pressure on the real. In earlier studies (e.g.
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 1995), the ratio of M2/Reserves was used as an indicator of the
vulnerability to such a crisis. In fact, our reading of the current round of panics is that they all
occurred in circumstances with very high levels of cross-border exposure. Thus, we find that the
ratio of short-term foreign debts to reserves is a more sensitive indicator of vulnerability than the
ratio of M2 to reserves. Future crises, however, may be triggered by domestic investors rather
than foreign investors. Once again, a priority for future research is an exploration of the relative
propensities of foreign and domestic investors to financial panic, as a step in creating a better
early-warning system.
facing emerging market economies, and the role of various types of financial claims in the onset offinancial panic.It is also important to note that for countries operating on pegged exchange rates, a panicby domestic investors can also deplete foreign exchange reserves, and thereby precipitate afinancial crisis. For example, holders of sight deposits in the banking system, or domestic holdersof treasury bills, might decide suddenly to convert their domestic assets into foreign exchange,thereby draining the foreign exchange reserves at the central bank (such, after all, is the classicframework for understanding a balance of payments crisis). The Brazilian government, forexample, owes about $250 in domestic debt (with an average maturity of about seven months),and redemptions of these notes have added to the pressure on the real. In earlier studies (e.g.Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 1995), the ratio of M2/Reserves was used as an indicator of thevulnerability to such a crisis. In fact, our reading of the current round of panics is that they alloccurred in circumstances with very high levels of cross-border exposure. Thus, we find that theratio of short-term foreign debts to reserves is a more sensitive indicator of vulnerability than theratio of M2 to reserves. Future crises, however, may be triggered by domestic investors ratherthan foreign investors. Once again, a priority for future research is an exploration of the relativepropensities of foreign and domestic investors to financial panic, as a step in creating a betterearly-warning system.
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