One of the most important observable facts about world
politics is that some states define their foreign policy
interests more broadly than others and pursue them
more aggressively. International relations theorists refer
to the most successful of these states as ‘major powers’,
or ‘great powers’, in more literary parlance. These states
are especially important in realist thought. Indeed, realist
writers sometimes focus on these states to the exclusion
of lesser powers (e.g. Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer,
2001). Even empirical research that does not share realist
assumptions commonly finds that major powers behave
differently. For example, Russett & Oneal (2001) found
that dyads containing a major power were significantly
more conflict-prone than others, a result shared by many
other researchers.
Why do some states expand their foreign policy ambitions
and adopt what might be called a major-power foreign
policy? Attempting to rise in status requires a policy
choice. Levy (1983) is among themost explicit in recognizing
this fact. In addition to having substantial military
power, he argues that great powers ‘think of their interests
as continental or global rather than local or regional’. He
points out that ‘they defend their interests more aggressively
and with a wider range of instrumentalities, including
the frequent threat or use ofmilitary force’. It is not obvious
why a state – even a powerful one – would expand its foreign
policy ambitions in this way.Doing so has always been
costly and has frequently ended in defeat and ruin. Not
every state that has had the capacity to pursue this course
has done so. The efforts of others, such as Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq, have ended (often disastrously) well before
they were recognized by other states as major powers.
This article will test several explanations for expanding
foreign policy ambitions. This question is rarely addressed
explicitly but international relations theory nevertheless
suggests several explanations. Because foreign policy ambition
cannot be directly observed, tests of these explanations
must focus on its behavioral manifestations. Expanding
One of the most important observable facts about world
politics is that some states define their foreign policy
interests more broadly than others and pursue them
more aggressively. International relations theorists refer
to the most successful of these states as ‘major powers’,
or ‘great powers’, in more literary parlance. These states
are especially important in realist thought. Indeed, realist
writers sometimes focus on these states to the exclusion
of lesser powers (e.g. Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer,
2001). Even empirical research that does not share realist
assumptions commonly finds that major powers behave
differently. For example, Russett & Oneal (2001) found
that dyads containing a major power were significantly
more conflict-prone than others, a result shared by many
other researchers.
Why do some states expand their foreign policy ambitions
and adopt what might be called a major-power foreign
policy? Attempting to rise in status requires a policy
choice. Levy (1983) is among themost explicit in recognizing
this fact. In addition to having substantial military
power, he argues that great powers ‘think of their interests
as continental or global rather than local or regional’. He
points out that ‘they defend their interests more aggressively
and with a wider range of instrumentalities, including
the frequent threat or use ofmilitary force’. It is not obvious
why a state – even a powerful one – would expand its foreign
policy ambitions in this way.Doing so has always been
costly and has frequently ended in defeat and ruin. Not
every state that has had the capacity to pursue this course
has done so. The efforts of others, such as Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq, have ended (often disastrously) well before
they were recognized by other states as major powers.
This article will test several explanations for expanding
foreign policy ambitions. This question is rarely addressed
explicitly but international relations theory nevertheless
suggests several explanations. Because foreign policy ambition
cannot be directly observed, tests of these explanations
must focus on its behavioral manifestations. Expanding
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
