In the field of FB research, a number of studies have investigated in detail the peculiarities of
non-family managers in the CEO positions in FBs (e.g., McConaughy, 2000; Blumentritt et
al., 2007; Lin & Hu, 2007). Regarding the role of the CFO in FBs, five studies were
identified that have explicitly addressed certain aspects of the CFO’s role in FBs. Gallo &
Vilaseca (1998) analyzed the differences between family CFOs and non-family CFOs based
on a survey of large Spanish FBs. They found that in larger and older FBs, non-family
managers fill the CFO position. However, they found no correlation between the CFO’s
family status and the performance of the FB. According to their findings, family members in
the CFO position are more powerful and have a higher influence on strategic decisions than
do non-family CFOs. Gallo & Vilaseca (1998) concluded that FBs lack efficient control
mechanisms for non-family CFOs and, therefore, delegate less decision-making power to
non-family CFOs.